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NOTES
Civil Procedure--New Rules for an Old Game: North Carolina
Compulsory Counterclaim Provision Applies in Divorce Suits
Piecemeal litigation has been a prevalent feature in divorce ac-
tions. Adverse parties filing similar claims in separate counties, racing
to judgment in hopes of barring the other's claim, is a common pattern
in marital disputes.1 Traditionally, the doctrine of abatement, which
requires that an action initiated during the pendency of a prior action
be dismissed if the two are sufficiently similar, provided a way to dis-
pose of unnecessary litigation. In divorce actions, however, the doc-
trine has been narrowly applied.' In contrast, employment of a
compulsory counterclaim theory could prevent unnecessary litigation
in circumstances in which strict application of abatement would not.
Thus, it was anticipated that the adoption of a compulsory counter-
claim rule as part of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure3
could alter the procedures once followed in divorce suits.4 In Gardner
v. Gardner,5 the North Carolina Supreme Court made this change clear
by holding that counterclaims for divorce, with one narrow exception,
are compulsory counterclaims within the meaning of rule 13(a).6
In Gardner, a wife sued for alimony and divbrce on the ground
that her husband had abandoned her when he moved out of the marital
home.7 Shortly before the husband was required to answer, his own
1. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473 (1967); Beeson v. Beeson,
246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957); Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952); Cook
v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639 (1912); McLeod v. McLeod, 1 N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635
(1968).
2. E.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I (1969).
4. See McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 114, 221 S.E.2d 490, 494 (1976) (dictum); 2 R.
LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §144 (3d ed. Supp. 1976) (author suggests new rules of civil
procedure may alter prior case law).
5. 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).
6. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if
(1) At the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or
(2) The opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process
by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment
on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this rule.
7. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2(4), -7(l) (1976). The
wife prayed initially for alimony without divorce. She later amended her complaint to state a
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claim for absolute divorce based on the one-year statutory separation
period' accrued.9 While his wife's action was pending, the husband
filed his divorce claim in another county.'0 The wife, relying on both
abatement and compulsory counterclaim theories, moved that her hus-
band's action be dismissed or stayed until her own action could be de-
termined."I The court denied her motions,' 2 and the court of appeals
denied her writ of certiorari.'
3
On appeal,' 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided for the
wife.' 5 The court held, based on the compulsory counterclaim rule, 6
that the husband's claim for divorce was a compulsory counterclaim in
the wife's suit.' 7 The governing rule, 13(a), makes counterclaims aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim
claim for alimony and divorce from bed and board, a judicial separation of husband and wife that
can be nullified by resumption of marital relations. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1977).
9. See 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401-02. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1) provides in part: "A
defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon
him." The summons and complaint in the wife's action were served on the husband on May 17,
1976. His claim accrued on May 28, 1976, one year after he had left home. Brief for Appellant at
2.
10. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 402. The wife filed her claim in Wayne County one day
after she moved there from the Johnston County residence she and her husband had maintained
for many years. Before filing his independent action, the husband moved to transfer the wife's
action to Johnston County, where he still lived, on the basis of improper venue. The motion was
denied. While appeal of the motion was pending, the husband moved to transfer the wife's action
onfonm non con eniens grounds. Id. at 173-74, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
I1. Id. at 174-76, 240 S.E.2d at 402-03.
12. Id. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 402. Petitioner's motions were heard and denied in Johnston
County District Court. Petitioner filed for a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals requesting
review of the order. Brief for Appellant at 3.
13. Brief for Appellant at 4.
14. The North Carolina Supreme Court ordered that petitioner's writ for discretionary re-
view under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (Cum. Supp. 1977) be allowed. Brief for Appellant at 4.
The court emphasized that it took the case not because the appellate court had abused its discre-
tion, but "because we desired to address the important and novel questions relating to the applica-
bility of the compulsory counterclaim provisions. . .for the guidance of the bench and bar." 294
N.C. at 173, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
15. 294 N.C. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406.
16. The wife had abandoned her reliance on the abatement theory. Id. at 175-76, 240 S.E.2d
at 402-03. Her husband, however, contended that the abatement theory and the prior case law
based on it were still good law. Id. at 175, 240 S.E.2d at 402; see Brief for Appellee at 4-12. While
the court hinted that abatement might still be a viable doctrine, its adoption of the compulsory
counterclaim procedures appears to negate the use of the doctrine in a Gardner context.
17. Relying on the premise that his wife's amendment should not relate back and thus her
action should be considered one for alimony without divorce, the husband argued that N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.8 (1969) made his claim merely permissive. Brief for Appellee at 7. The statute
provides in part: "The procedure in actions for alimony . . . shall be as in other civil actions
except as provided in this section." It also provides that actions for alimony may be filed as
counterclaims in divorce actions and actions for divorce may be filed as counterclaims in alimony
without divorce proceedings. The court, while failing throughout its opinion to distinguish be-
tween the wife's original and amended claim, pointed out that the statute was enacted in 1955 at a
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compulsory in the plaintiff's suit. The court also held that when a
claim that is compulsory in a prior pending suit is filed separately, the
claim should be either stayed or dismissed with leave to file in the first
suit.18 Although the compulsory counterclaim rule does not specify this
result, 19 the court thought its holding necessary to promote the rule's
policies of avoiding wasteful litigation and inconsistent results.
The court further stated that if the second claim were filed after
final judgment in the first action, the claim would not be barred by the
compulsory counterclaim rule.2" It emphasized that this limitation was
consistent with a policy courts have strongly adhered to-that of main-
taining the marital ties. A spouse undesirous of pursuing a divorce is
not forced to do so by the institution of a related action by the other
spouse, yet remains free to change his mind later.2 '
Prior to North Carolina's adoption of the rules of civil procedure,
a there was no compulsory counterclaim rule.22 Rather, any claim aris-
ing out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim was permitted to
be filed either as a counterclaim2 3 or in a separate suit.24 When a claim
time when there was no compulsory counterclaim concept and counterclaims for alimony in ac-
tions for divorce were not allowed. Having placed the statute in its historical context, the court
reasoned it would not undermine the legislative intent to superimpose rule 13(a) on the statute and
make the counterclaim compulsory. 294 N.C. at 178, 240 S.E.2d at 404.
18. 294 N.C. at 177, 240 S.E.2d at 403 (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1409, 1418 (1971)).
19. See note 6 supra. See also 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1418 (1971). The authors point out:
Although it is well established that a party is barred from suing on a claim that
should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in a prior action, one closely
related question remains unsettled. What would prevent a party who does not want to
assert his claim as a compulsory counterclaim in a suit instituted by his opponent from
bringing an independent action on that claim while the first action still is pending?
20. 294 N.C. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406. The court noted, however, that the doctrine of res
judicata may operate to bar a subsequent claim. Id. at 181 n.7, 240 S.E.2d at 406 n.7.
21. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 405-06. As one court noted, there is a paucity of case law on the
effect of the compulsory counterclaim provisions on divorce actions. Stolar v. Stolar, 359 A.2d
597, 598 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Gardner court, in carving out this exception to the counterclaim
rule, relied on Moats v. Moats, 168 Colo. 120, 450 P.2d 64 (1969), which pointed out that without
the exception, the rule would interfere with substantive rights. Id. at 125, 450 P.2d at 66. Other
courts have reached differing conclusions on the effects of the rule. In Stolar, rule 13(a) was
applied to bar a claim for absolute divorce on the ground that the claim should have been filed as
a counterclaim in an earlier unsuccessful divorce suit filed by the other spouse. 359 A.2d at 599.
On the other hand, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated in dictum that notwithstanding the
compulsory counterclaim rule, a defendant still has a choice of asserting a divorce claim in a
separate suit. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 357 Mo. 634, 645, 210 S.W.2d 31, 36 (1948).
22. W. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 13-2 (1975).
23. Id. The former statutory provision relating to counterclaims, CODE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 101 (1868) (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953)) (repealed 1970), also
permitted as counterclaims all contract actions.
24. E.g., Union Trust v. McKinne, 179 N.C. 328, 102 S.E. 385 (1920).
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was filed separately during the pendency of a prior related action, the
doctrine of abatement was often invoked by the original plaintiff to
force dismissal of the second suit.25 Like the compulsory counterclaim
rule, the doctrine is designed to avoid multiple actions and inconsistent
results.26
The doctrine, however, has grave weaknesses. It is applied only
when both actions are filed in North Carolina. 7 Moreover, some
courts refuse to apply it in divorce actions, 8 producing wasteful litiga-
tion and confusion. Further, the doctrine requires dismissal of the sec-
ond divorce action only if the plaintiff in that action can obtain the
same relief by counterclaiming in the first and if his claim would be
defeated by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the first suit.2 9 This
25. See, e.g., McDowell v. Blythe Bros., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952). The conditions
for abating an action because of the pendency of a prior action are traditionally that the two be
substantially identical in parties, subject matter, issues involved, and relief demanded. Whitehurst
v. Hinton, 230 N.C. 16, 22, 51 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1949).
26. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 322, 56 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1949).
27. Historically, the doctrine of abatement has not required dismissal of an action filed in one
state while a related action is pending in another. See Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139
S.E.2d 217 (1964). Courts, however, have sometimes made discretionary determinations that the
second action should be stayed pending the outcome of the first. See Acorn v. Jones Knitting
Corp., 12 N.C. App. 266, 182 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 511, 183 S.E.2d 686 (1971).
28. In Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957), the court allowed an alimony
without divorce action filed subsequent to an absolute divorce action to proceed independently.
While the abatement doctrine was argued strenuously on appeal, Brief for Appellant at 4-7; Brief
for Appellee at 2-3, the court omitted any reference to it. Instead, it reasoned from a recent
statutory change that for the first time allowed a wife to counterclaim in her husband's divorce
action. 246 N.C. at 332, 98 S.E.2d at 18. This change, according to the court, gives a wife a choice
of asserting her claim in either a pending or a separate suit. Id.; see 36 N.C.L. REv. 203 (1958). In
Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473 (1967), the Beeson fact situation was reversed
and both claims were again allowed to proceed independently. While mentioning in dictum the
abatement theory, the Fullwood court permitted the second action to proceed because the hus-
band's claim for absolute divorce based on the statutory separation period had not accrued in time
for him to assert it in his wife's prior suit. Id. at 423, 154 S.E.2d at 475. Although the Fullwood
result would appear to be the same after Gardner, see note 45 and accompanying text infra, the
vitality of Beeson is less certain. The Gardner court's superimposition of the compulsory counter-
claim provision on the statute that allows counterclaims for alimony in divorce suits (and counter-
claims for divorce in alimony suits), see note 17 supra, appears to change the Beeson result. This
conclusion is complicated, however, because the statute specifically allows the alimony claim to be
filed either separately or as a cross action, while it states merely that cross actions for divorce
"shall be allowable" in alimony suits. Since the Gardner opinion, which dealt with the latter
situation, concentrated on the entire statute in holding the former filing option mandatory, it is
likely that the section allowing alimony claims to be filed separately will be held only to cover
situations in which there is no previously filed divorce claim. If so, then Beeson is no longer
controlling.
29. The requirements for abatement in the divorce context were enunciated most clearly in
Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952). The court held that the ordinary test for
determining whether an action should be abated is not applicable when "the parties to the prior
action appear in the subsequent action in reverse order, and the plaintiff in the second action, as
defendant in the first, has failed to plead a counterclaim or cross demand for the same cause of
action." Id. at 85, 68 S.E.2d at 798. In such a case, the law devises a special test. Id. at 86, 68
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test, based on principles of res judicata,30 is so restrictive that the sec-
ond action has rarely been dismissed.'
The Gardner decision has done away with the confusing proce-
dures and wasteful results dictated by prior case law. The abatement
approach, with its emphasis on whether res judicata would necessarily
bar a subsequent claim, is now replaced by a simpler approach that
focuses on the common factual bases of the related claims. Because
application of the abatement doctrine is so laden with rules and excep-
tions that related claims are often permitted to proceed indepen-
dently,3" the new approach is an important step in the direction of
S.E.2d at 799. The fact situation the Cameron court was referring to was and is obviously a
pattern common to divorce actions.
30. The term "res judicata" is used to encompass the doctrines of bar, merger and collateral
estoppel. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 532 (2d ed. 1977).
31. The adverse effects of the special application of the abatement theory in the divorce con-
text were illustrated in Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639 (1912), in which a husband filed an
action for divorce based on a 10 year separation period and his wife subsequently initiated a
separate suit for a limited divorce on the ground of abandonment. A divided court allowed the
wife's action to proceed, reasoning that to force her to bring her claim in the prior action would be
particularly inappropriate in a marital context "where a party may not desire to presently seek
affirmative relief, in the hope that a different course would more likely lead to a reconciliation."
Id. at 50, 74 S.E. at 641. Further, since the substantive law at the time allowed an absolute
divorce based on the statutory separation period irrespective of fault, the court concluded that the
issues to be determined in the husband's action would not be the same as those in the wife's
abandonment claim and thus doctrines of former adjudication would pose no bar to her action.
The dissent recognized the need to adjudicate divorce actions in one proceeding and the practical
problems inherent in the majority's result. It pointed out the obvious: had the husband been
granted an absolute divorce prior to the entry of judgment in the wife's action, her claim for
divorce, absolute or limited and regardless of the grounds, would have necessarily been barred.
Id. at 52, 74 S.E. at 642 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
In McLeod v. McLeod, I N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635 (1968), the court held that an ali-
mony without divorce action would not abate a subsequently filed claim for absolute divorce
because a judgment on the merits in the first action would not bar the second. Id. at 398, 161
S.E.2d at 636. While technically this was true, MfcLeod demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the
Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 769 (1952), test in protecting against needless litiga-
tion time and expense. See note 29 supra.
The other prong of the Cameron text-that the plaintiff in the second action be able to obtain
the same relief in the first--coupled with peculiar laws governing alimony, also produced unnec-
essary litigation. Until 1967, a dependent spouse could not secure alimony and an absolute di-
vorce at the same time. 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 135. Her only means of preserving alimony was
by first initiating an action for alimony and later an action for divorce. A prior alimony decree
would survive a divorce judgment granted either spouse. Id. § 135, at 51-55 (1963). Because
before 1955 a wife could only file an alimony action in a separate proceeding, it followed that,
under the abatement test, a wife's action for alimony without divorce could proceed independently
of her husband's prior divorce suit. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 322-23, 56 S.E.2d 641, 642-43
(1949).
32. For example, the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to make conclusive a prior de-
termination of an issue of fact in a subsequent proceeding if the issue was actually litigated in the
first action. Some courts require the common issue to have been an essential element or ultimate
fact in both actions, King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844); others apply the doctrine to an evidentiary
fact in the first or second if certain factors exist, The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1944).
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effective use of court time. Furthermore, by creating a narrow excep-
tion when the second claim is filed after judgment in the first, the court
demonstrated it will not allow procedural policies to interfere with the
substantive policy of maintaining the marital bonds.33
The Gardner opinion, however, leaves room for disregard of these
procedural aims in allowing judges an apparently unrestricted option
to stay, as well as dismiss, a separately filed claim that is a compulsory
counterclaim in a prior pending suit. Under the prior procedure, the
abatement doctrine was applied to require dismissal of the second ac-
tion as a matter of law.34 By appearing to permit in all circumstances
the alternative of a stay, the court is sanctioning a second suit after
judgment in the first, which would defeat the efficiency goals of the
compulsory counterclaim rule.35 The emphasis throughout Gardner on
avoiding wasteful litigation and circuity of action, however, suggests
that it may be necessary to confine those situations in which a stay
might be appropriate.
The Gardner court, unfortunately, failed to provide any standards.
In giving courts the options of stay and dismissal, it cited various fed-
eral court decisions, some of which have stayed and others of which
have dismissed the compulsory counterclaim filed as a separate suit.36
These courts, in general, also provide little guidance concerning when a
stay might be appropriate.
One justification for granting a stay of the second action could be
to protect the second plaintiff's choice of forum. Although courts rarely
33. For a discussion of treatment of this issue by other state courts, see note 21 supra. In
certain statutory areas, the federal courts have found substantive policies to outweigh the procedu-
ral policies behind rule 13(a). See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 1412. For exam-
ple, in Local 11, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec., Inc., 363 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
1966), the court refused to require grievances pending in arbitration to be pleaded as compulsory
counterclaims in actions brought on grievances outside the scope of arbitration because to do so
would be contrary to a national labor policy that encourages arbitration. Id. at 185.
34. W.S. Boyd Sales Co. v. Seymour, 255 N.C. 714, 122 S.E.2d 605 (1961).
35. A total eclipse of the rule's goals would be avoided because a stay would still eliminate
the races to judgment that existed in the past. Moreover, collateral estoppel will preclude litiga-
tion in the second suit of issues actually decided in the first. Furthermore, res judicata could, it
seems, operate to foreclose many of these second suits since it precludes a suit between the same
parties on a claim that has been previously litigated between them. Yet, because the compulsory
counterclaim and resjudicata doctrines serve many of the same policies, it may be inconsistent to
allow a compulsory counterclaim to be stayed and then to say later that resjudicata requires it to
be barred.
36. 294 N.C. at 177, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
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give forum protection much consideration,37 federal courts have in gen-
eral been more sympathetic to the idea when it appears that forum
shopping alone motivated the original plaintiffs forum choice. 8 In-
deed, forum protection may often justify a stay in a divorce controversy
because the substantive law governing divorce claims enables one
spouse easily to thwart the other's choice of forum. A typical scenario
follows: The wife's claim for alimony without divorce or for limited
divorce on the ground of abandonment arises as soon as the husband
leaves home; the husband, however, must wait until the one-year sepa-
ration period expires before his absolute divorce claim accrues. By a
timely filing of her claims so that her spouse's claim accrues prior to his
deadline for answering, the wife can force her husband's compulsory
counterclaim39 and defeat his forum choice. The husband, to protect
his forum preference, must ask for transfer of venue in his wife's action
and/or, according to Gardner, file his claim independently and petition
for a stay. A stay pending the outcome of the wife's action may there-
fore be justified to protect the husband's forum preference.
A stay would be particularly well justified when there is additional
evidence that "forum thwarting" motivated the choice of situs in the
first suit as, for example, when the wife files suit in one jurisdiction the
day after she moves there from another jurisdiction in which she and
her husband have lived for many years.40 Indeed, there may be other
special reasons for staying the second action. Absent undue prejudice,
however, the ease with which litigants can travel between courts within
the same state coupled with the advantages of consolidating litigation
should be weighed heavily in determining the limits of Gardner's li-
cense to stay claims that are compulsory counterclaims in prior pending
suits.
The application of the counterclaim rule to circumstances different
from Gardner is uncertain. In Gardner, because both claims were
based on the separation that occurred when the husband left home,4'
37. Judicial protocol requires that when two courts of competent jurisdiction entertain re-
lated actions, the court in which the first action was brought should be given priority. McDowell
v. Blythe Bros., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952).
38. See Mattel, Inc. v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1965); Leonard F.
Feilman Co. v. Smith-Corona Marchant Inc., 27 F.R.D. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
39. The husband's counterclaim will not be forced, of course, if he avails himself of the coun-
terclaim exception and files suit only after judgment on his wife's claim. Clearly, however, in
many circumstances central issues in the second suit will be precluded by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
40. The situation in Gardner was a good example of this problem of "forum thwarting." See
note 10 supra.
41. 294 N.C. at 176, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
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they were characterized as arising out of the "same transaction or oc-
currence" and thus deemed compulsory. However, a divorce claim
based on adultery, for example, may not be held to arise out of the
same factual circumstances as one based on mental cruelty.42 Another
requirement of a compulsory counterclaim is that it be a claim "which
at the time of serving the pleading, the pleader has against any oppos-
ing party."43 While in Gardner the husband's claim for divorce arose
before the time he was required to answer in his wife's suit,' this defi-
nition requires that when the claim arises afterwards, both actions may
proceed independently.45
The scope of the counterclaim exception created by the court for
circumstances in which the second claim is filed after judgment in the
first also remains uncertain. In Gardner, the husband's claim was for a
complete divorce.46 Had he filed it after judgment in his wife's action,
the court said, the compulsory counterclaim rule would not bar its
prosecution because of the policy of protecting the marital bonds.47 If
the court's reasoning is carried further, counterclaims for alimony with-
out divorce or for any remedy less than a complete severance of the
marital ties could be barred if not asserted in the first action, because
requiring their assertion if available may not be held to offend the pol-
icy that led the court to limit its holding.48 Nevertheless, a counter-
claim for a limited divorce may prove sufficiently offensive to the
policy favoring marriage to trigger the exception.
Finally, the employment of Gardner's counterclaim rule when one
of the two actions is filed outside North Carolina is also unclear. It
seems certain that when the North Carolina action is filed last, North
Carolina courts no longer have the discretion to continue proceeding as
42. The issue of the compulsory nature of the claim may be largely academic because a
number of grounds are normally stated in a divorce claim, one of which is abandonment. In fact,
in Gardner, abandonment was one of numerous grounds, id. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401, yet the
court focused solely on abandonment in holding that both claims were part of the same occur-
rence, id. at 176, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
43. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a), quoted in note 6 supra.
44. See note 9 supra.
45. The same result was reached in Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473
(1967), discussed in note 28 supra, prior to the enactment of the rules of procedure. Of course, as
has been pointed out, a wife could avoid this situation by a timely filing of her claim.
46. 294 N.C. at 173, 240 S.E.2d at 402.
47. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406.
48. A recent statutory change, however, requires a court to ensure that all support and ali-
mony claims, if existent, have been adjudicated before it grants an absolute divorce based on the
statutory separation period. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1977).
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they did under the abatement doctrine,49 but are required either to dis-
miss or to stay the claim." What other jurisdictions will do when they
entertain the second action remains to be seen. A refusal to dismiss or
stay the second claim when it is a compulsory counterclaim in the
North Carolina suit is arguably a violation of the Constitution's full
faith and credit clause,51 which requires states to honor the public acts
and judicial proceedings of other states absent a strong state policy dic-
tating otherwise. 2 The compulsory counterclaim rule in general has,
however, met with problems in interstate actions,5 3 with states invoking
this exception and refusing to honor the rules of other states on the
ground that they are protecting their own citizens.54 Until the United
States Supreme Court rules on the status of compulsory counterclaims
in interstate actions, races to judgment will continue when similar ac-
tions are filed in separate states.
The Gardner result was a logical implementation of the policy un-
derlying the rules of procedure of avoiding wasteful litigation and in-
consistent results. The new practice that the court prescribed is a
needed amendment of the old, but the court did not go far enough in
effectuating the rules' aims. Instead, it left the question whether to stay
or dismiss the second claim wholly to the discretion of trial judges, per-
mitting possible frustration of the rules' intent. Many other questions,
though not squarely presented in Gardner, are also certain to
arise--questions such as the appropriate solution in interstate actions,
the compulsory nature of a claim for less than a complete divorce, and
the reach of the "transaction or occurrence" test. The courts must now
49. See note 27 supra.
50. There is nothing in Gardner to suggest that the compulsory counterclaim rule does not
cross state lines. However, because the court did note that the substantive law governing abate-
ment is not necessarily abrogated, 294 N.C. at 175 n.5, 240 S.E.2d at 402 n.5, it is possible that
courts will continue to use the old procedure.
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
52. This clause "does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory
policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in each case
between the competing public policies involved." Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
53. See Kennedy, Counterclaims Under Federal Rule 13, 11 Hous. L. REv. 255, 280-83
(1974).
54. Of course a foreign court in a Gardner situation could also contend that giving effect to
North Carolina's compulsory counterclaim rule deprives its citizens of substantive rights because
the substdntive divorce law of North Carolina does not afford them much protection. See Vestal,
Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REV. 1I, 20-21, 24 (1961).
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pick up where Gardner left off and resolve these issues consistent with
the purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule.
HARRIET S. SUGAR
Criminal Law-State v. Looney: Defendants' Need for Court-
Ordered Psychiatric Evaluations of Witnesses' Credibility
Outweighed by Witnesses' Right to Privacy
A growing number of states have held that in criminal trials judges
have the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a key prosecu-
tion witness when there is evidence the examination may disclose an
abnormal mental condition bearing on credibility.' In a case of first
impression, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Looney2 refused to join this growing body of jurisdictions recognizing
such discretion in the trial court. Without expressly deciding whether
the trial judge lacked the inherent authority to order a witness to sub-
mit to a psychiatric exam, the supreme court strongly suggested that
under present North Carolina criminal procedure the trial judge should
not order such an examination of a witness in the absence of specific
statutory guidelines provided by the North Carolina legislature.3 The
Looney court then concluded that, even if the trial court could properly
have granted defendant's motion for a court-ordered exam, denial of
the motion under the circumstances of the Looney case was not an
abuse of discretion.4
On December 30, 1974, the mutilated body of defendant Looney's
wife was discovered in the Looney home.5 Subsequent investigation of
1. For a recent case evidencing the trend toward sanctioning court-ordered psychiatric ex-
ams, see Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977). For a collection of cases on the
subject, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968). Federal courts trying criminal cases also have the
authority to order a government witness to submit to a psychiatric examination in order to probe
the witness' credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978).
3. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
4. Id.
5. Record at 22. The police officials involved in the case and the pathologist who performed
an autopsy on the body later testified under cross-examination that the case was the most, or one
of the most, brutal homicides they had encountered. Id. at 22, 25, 31, 34. The decedent received
several blows and stabs that independently would have been fatal. Id. at 34. The body showed
evidence of more than 60 severe wounds. Id. at 32. In support of his motion for a psychiatric
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the murder led to the arrest of Richard Stanley Matthews who, in a
signed confession, stated that he killed the decedent after she rejected
his sexual advance.6 Matthews was examined at a state hospital and
was found sane and competent to stand trial.7 In exchange for a reduc-
tion in the charge against him,8 Matthews agreed to testify for the State,
alleging that defendant, Jasper David Looney, hired him to do the kill-
ing.9 Defendant repeatedly denied his guilt, claiming that he had been
happily married and that he had never met Matthews. 0 Nevertheless,
Looney was convicted of conspiring with Matthews to commit murder
and of being an accessory before the fact."
exam defendant Looney argued that the brutality of the murder suggested it was performed by a
psychopathic killer. Id. at 11; see note 12 infra.
6. Matthews' statement described in detail how he accomplished the slaying with a hammer,
a pair of scissors, and two knives. Record at 8-9. In his motion for a court-ordered exam defend-
ant pointed to Matthews' statement, "I... started to hit her in the head.., and the more blood I
seen the more blood I wanted to see," id. at 9, as further evidence that Matthews had a psycho-
pathic personality that would affect the accuracy and veracity of his testimony, id. at 11.
7. 294 N.C. at 4, 240 S.E.2d at 614. Matthews was examined at Dorothea Dix Hospital in
Raleigh, North Carolina, which provides care and treatment for the insane. Id. at 17, 240 S.E.2d
at 621. During the psychiatric exam Matthews denied having killed Mrs. Looney. Record at 16.
The examining staff psychiatrist stated in his report to the court:
He was given the MMPI [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory] . . . and the
results. . . strongly suggested that the patient has a need to see himself as an extremely
virtuous individual. He presented himself in an unrealistically favorable light concern-
ing self-control, moral values, and freedom from everyday human frailties. Individuals
with his results do at times show maladaptive hyperactivity, irritability, anger, and an
inability to postpone gratification .... Psychiatric examination of the defendant, does
not reveal the presence of a psychiatric disorder which would render the patient unable
to know right from wrong or unable to know the nature and consequences of his ac-
tions. . . . PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS: Without Psychosis, Not Insane.
id. at 15-16.
The psychiatrist later testified for defendant Looney as follows:
The results of the tests and interviews [with Matthews] indicated the possibility of a
psychopathic personality and a maniac state which is the opposite of depression.
*. . As a result of my psychological testing and interviews with Richard Stanley
Matthews I found evidence indicating that he had personality characteristic of a psycho-
path. . . . The characteristics of a psychopathic personality reveal one that is notori-
ously disloyal, unable to form trusting relationships, dishonest, feels no guilt over pain
and suffering they inflict on others, unable to postpone gratification and will do anything
they can to get their way.
* * * My opinion is that that conduct [suggested by State's exhibits of the body's
condition] is highly suggestive but not necessarily diagnostic of a psychopath.
Id. at 123-24.
8. Record at 48.
9. Id. Thus, in a one-month period witness Matthews took three positions with respect to
his guilt: first, that he had killed the decedent acting alone (statement to police); second, that he
was innocent (statement to psychiatrist); and finally, that he had performed a "contract killing"
for defendant Looney (plea-bargaining position). Matthews thereafter pleaded guilty to second
degree murder and received a life sentence. 294 N.C. at 3-4, 240 S.E.2d at 613.
10. 294 N.C. at 8-9, 240 S.E.2d at 616.
11. Id. at 3, 240 S.E.2d at 613. Looney had also been charged with murder, but that charge
was later dismissed. Id.
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Looney moved unsuccessfully on two occasions prior to trial for
the court to order Matthews to submit to a psychiatric examination to
determine whether Matthews had an abnormal mental condition that
would affect his credibility. 2 Looney contended on appeal 3 that the
brutality of the crime,' 4 the findings of abnormal personality in Mat-
thews' competency examination,' 5 the inconsistent positions taken by
Matthews,' 6 and the importance of his testimony1 7 justified an order for
a second psychiatric exam to explore the possibility that Matthews was
a psychopathic liar. 8 Defendant further pointed out that the earlier
exam had focused on Matthews' sanity as a defendant, not on Mat-
thews' credibility as a witness.' 9 Overruling this and other excep-
tions,2° the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld both counts of
12. In his first motion Looney recited the brutality of the murder and Matthews' inconsistent
positions concerning the crime and alleged that Matthews' acts were those of an independent
psychopathic killer. Looney contended that it was essential to his defense to determine the com-
plainant's psychological make-up and that a psychological exam could be helpful in arriving at
the truth. Record at 11-12. The motion continued:
NOW, THEREFORE, the defendant moves that a psychiatric examination of Rich-
ard Stanley Matthews, Jr. be granted this defendant; that a Court order issue whereby he
is to submit himself under proper supervision to a psychiatric examination by a psychia-
trist not under the direct control of the State of North Carolina, and that a copy of that
report be furnished to the defendant ....
Id. at 12. The motion was denied, the judge stating that he questioned whether a trial court had
the authority to order such a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 17. Defendant repeated his motion
after learning the results of Matthews' competency/sanity examination, which had revealed per-
sonality abnormalities. See note 7 supra. Although defendant cited some authority for the pro-
position that the court could order the exam, the motion was again denied. The judge stated that
defendant had not presented any substantial additional facts regarding Matthews' psychiatric
make-up and noted that Matthews had already received one psychiatric examination. Record at
17-19.
13. The supreme court allowed defendant to consolidate his appeal from the conspiracy con-
viction to the North Carolina Court of Appeals with his appeal from the accessory conviction to
the North Carolina Supreme Court. 294 N.C. at 3, 240 S.E.2d at 613.
14. See note 5 supra. In his testimony Matthews explained the brutality of the crime by
saying defendant had requested that Matthews make it look like a maniac had done the job. 294
N.C. at 6, 240 S.E.2d at 615.
15. 294 N.C. at 16-17, 240 S.E.2d at 621; see note 7 supra.
16. Record at 11; see note 9 supra.
17. Record at 12. The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with defendant that Matthews'
testimony "was the key to the prosecution's case against the defendant." 294 N.C. at 16, 240
S.E.2d at 621. The State, however, introduced six witnesses to rebut defendant's claims that he
had been happily married, including evidence that he was having an extramarital affair, and that
he did not know Matthews. Record at 53-79. The State also showed that defendant was cobenefi-
ciary of life insurance policies on his wife's life totalling $68,000. 294 N.C. at 6-8, 240 S.E.2d at
615-16.
18. 294 N.C. at 16-17, 240 S.E.2d at 622.
19. Id. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
20. The supreme court rejected defendant's claim that his conspiracy conviction was a lesser
included offense of his accessory before the fact conviction, noting that the reaching of an agree-
ment was an essential element of the conspiracy offense but not of the accessory offense, and that
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Looney's conviction.21 In its opinion the Looney court surveyed the
decisions of other states that have held that their trial courts have the
discretionary authority to order a prosecution witness to submit to a
psychiatric examination.2 2 The supreme court concluded that these de-
cisions underestimated the jury's ability to reach an appropriate evalu-
ation of the credibility of a mentally disturbed witness without expert
assistance,23 and also overlooked the burden a court-ordered psychiat-
ric exam places on the witness.24 Employing a balancing-of-interests
test, the court reasoned that an innocent defendant's need for a court-
ordered exam was outweighed by the witness' right to privacy and by
the public interest in encouraging testimony. The court strongly im-
plied that for these reasons, North Carolina courts should not grant a
motion for a court-ordered exam without specific statutory authority.25
The court then concluded that, even if the court below had the discre-
tion to order such an exam, it properly refused to do so because defend-
ant had failed to show a "compelling necessity" for the exam.26
actual commission of the related felony was essential to an accessory charge but not to a conspir-
acy charge. Id. at 10-11, 240 S.E.2d at 617-18. The court also rejected defendant's contention that
because Matthews had previously been examined by a state-employed psychiatrist, it was "funda-
mentally unfair" for the State to deny him an opportunity to have Matthews examined by an
independent psychiatrist. Id. at 17, 240 S.E.2d at 621 (distinguishing State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560,
143 A.2d 530 (1958)).
21. Id. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
22. Id. at 18-28, 240 S.E.2d at 622-27.
23. Id. at 18, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 622, 627.
24. Id. at 23, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 624, 627.
25. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627. The supreme court did not expressly hold that to order a
witness to submit to a psychiatric exam would be beyond the judicial power. The court did,
however, clearly express its opinion that the need for the exam was outweighed by the burden it
placed on the witness and on the prosecutorial function, and implied that to allow the granting of
Looney's motion would be a "drastic change" in North Carolina criminal procedure. Id. That
the court went on to conclude that even if the trial court had the power, its denial of the motion
was not an abuse of discretion, suggests that the supreme court only reached a firm conclusion on
the propriety of ordering an exam, not on the power of the court to order the exam.
26. Id. at 28-29, 240 S.E.2d at 628. The supreme court apparently raised on its own motion
the general issue whether a court-ordered exam would ever be proper in North Carolina. The
State conceded in its brief that the court below had discretionary authority to order the exam
based on inherent judicial power and on implications of present statutory powers. Brief for Ap-
pellee at 9 (citing N.C.R. Ctv. P. 35, 45(b); State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58 235 S E.2d 47 (1977)).
The State's primary argument was that there had been no abuse of discrelion in denying defend-
ant's motions. Brief for Appellee at 13. The court agreed. 294 N.C. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
In a concurring opinion Justice Exum agreed with the majority that there had been no abuse
of discretion, but stated that he would hold that North Carolina trial courts should grant a similar
motion if the defendant makes a "strong showing" that a psychiatric examination would probably
reveal a mental condition raising serious question about the witness' credibility. Id. at 29, 240
S.E.2d at 628 (concurring opinion).
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In the criminal law context a psychiatric examination, and the ex-
pert opinion drawn from its results, may be used for four distinct pur-
poses. First, examination of a criminal defendant is often required to
aid the trial judge in determining whether the accused is competent to
stand trial.27 Second, there may be an examination of the defendant by
one or more psychiatrists who later give testimony to aid the jury in
deciding whether the accused was sufficiently sane to be held legally
responsible for his alleged criminal acts.28 Third, and less frequently,
psychiatric examination of a witness in a criminal trial may be useful to
the judge in determining whether the person examined is a competent
witness29 or, fourth, useful to the jury in weighing witness credibility. 30
The Looney decision runs counter to the trend in other states in
which there has been increasing acceptance of the fourth use of court-
ordered exams mentioned above-to aid the jury in assessing witness
credibility. 3' As noted by the Looney court,32 the impetus for finding
27. The legal standards for making judgments about abnormalities in a defendant's or a wit-
ness' mental condition vary among the states. In general, when presented with an issue of compe-
tency to stand trial, the trial judge must determine whether the accused has sufficient
understanding of the nature and consequences of the charges and proceedings being brought
against him and whether he has the ability to cooperate with his lawyer in preparing his defense.
See, e.g., State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 575, 234 S.E.2d 587, 592 (1977).
28. Although various tests have been employed, in most states the accused will be held le-
gally responsible for his acts or will be treated as criminally insane depending on whether, in the
jury's opinion, given his mental condition at the time of his alleged criminal conduct, the accused
had the ability to know what he was doing and whether it was right or wrong. See generally
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The North Carolina rule was recently
stated as follows: "[T]he test of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is the capacity to distin-
guish between right and wrong at the time of and in respect to the matter under investigation."
State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 569, 213 S.E.2d 305, 318 (1974).
29. The emerging modem standard for witness competency is whether the prospective wit-
ness has such mental capacity to observe, recollect, and relate events that his testimony will aid the
\jury in finding facts. See generally McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 62
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. The rule in North Carolina is whether
the proposed witness has the capacity "to understand and to relate under the obligation of an oath
facts which will assist the jury in determining the truth with respect to the ultimate facts which it
will be called upon to decide." State v. Cooke, 278 N.C. 288, 290, 179 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1971).
30. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 45. The cases that have accepted this fourth
use of psychiatric testimony are cited in note 37 infra. The issue whether the court below should
have granted defendant's motion for a court-ordered psychiatric examination of Matthews in-
volves the last of these four uses of psychiatric testimony. It is relevant to the weight a trial judge
should give any previous examinations of the witness that in the first three situations a person's
mental condition is assessed for the purpose of making an absolute legal classification, that is, a
person either is or is not competent to stand trial, criminally insane, or competent as a witness.
But in the fourth situation, a psychiatrist's testimony concerning the witness' mental condition is
intended to be helpful to the jury in deciding what weight to give a witness' testimony, not
whether a witness is absolutely incredible or completely credible. See note 67 infra.
31. See note I supra.
32. 294 N.C. at 18, 240 S.E.2d at 622.
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trial court discretion to order a prosecution witness to submit to psychi-
atric evaluation was provided by Dean Wigmore.33 Influenced by al-
leged advances in psychiatry, and more specifically the use of
psychiatric examination in identifying rape complainants suffering
from delusion,34 Wigmore proposed that a psychiatric examination of
the complainant be required in sex-offense cases.35
Although no state has adopted a mandatory exam rule,36 most
states confronted with the issue have upheld the trial court's discretion
to order such an exam.37 A survey of jurisdictions employing a discre-
tionary rule reveals differing judicial treatment of three primary issues
arising from application of the rule. First, certain courts strictly limit
the rule to sex-offense cases,38 while other courts employ a rule of gen-
eral applicability, permitting the trial judge to order witness-credibility
33. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970).
34. Professor Wigmore cited five medical authorities to support his conclusion that many
innocent men were sentenced to prison because without the results of psychiatric examinations of
the complaining witnesses they were unable to attack the plausibility of the complainants' testi-
mony. See id. at 740-46.
35. Since Wigmore's proposal, substantial progress has been made in psychiatric diagnosis of
abnormal personalities and in the understanding of the extent to which mental disorders may
affect credibility. See generally Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 214-15 (1957);
Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 648 (1960).
36. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 112,459 P.2d 727,730 (1969); State v. Maestas,
190 Neb. 312, 313, 207 N.W.2d 699, 700 (1973). Several states expressly rejected Wigmore's pro-
posal. See, e.g., State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 412 P.2d 23 (1966); State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223,
132 N.W.2d 847 (1965).
37. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102,459 P.2d 727 (1969); Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d
433 (1955); McDonald v. State, 307 A.2d 796 (Del. 1973); Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1971); State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973);
People v. Glover, 49 Ill. 2d 78, 273 N.E.2d 367 (1971); Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d
901 (1970); State v. Oswald, 306 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1957) (by implication); State v. Maestas, 190
Neb. 312, 207 N.W.2d 699 (1973); State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958); State v.
Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 446 P.2d 116 (1968); State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 132 N.W.2d 847 (1965);
Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157
(1967). For a discussion of the early cases cited above, see Note, Criminal Law-Psychiatric Ex-
amination of Prosecutrix in Rape Case, 45 N.C.L. REv. 234 (1966).
A mandatory exam rule in sex-offense cases prevailed briefly in Indiana. Burton v. State, 232
Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953). The mandatory aspect of that decision was soon overruled.
Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957). Massachusetts has a statute granting the
trial judge discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a witness, which provides: "In order to
determine the mental condition of any party or witness before any court of the commonwealth,
the presiding judge may, in his discretion, request the department to assign a qualified physician,
who, if assigned shall make such examinations as the judge may deem necessary." MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972).
38. See e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 172, 410 P.2d 838, 846, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 310-11 (1966). The Looney court found no significant distinction between sex-offense cases
and non-sex-offense cases. 294 N.C. at 26, 240 S.E.2d at 626. This conclusion allowed the court to
point to the states that restricted the rule to sex-offense cases and conclude that they had made an
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examinations in any criminal case.39 Second, the various courts disa-
gree, at least semantically, on the standard to be applied by the trial
court when deciding whether the evidence set forth by the defendant
justifies an examination. "Compelling reason" is a popular guide,40 but
other opinions use "substantial showing of need and justification,"'4 1
"most compelling of circumstances where it is necessary to insure a just
and orderly disposition of the cause,"'42 or "strong showing. ' 43 Third,
courts would react differently to the possibility of a witness refusing to
submit to the exam. There is general agreement that an uncooperative
patient cannot be satisfactorily examined by a psychiatrist,' and,
therefore, a contempt citation is not considered to be a viable enforce-
ment mechanism. 45 Some courts propose that the witness' submission
to the exam be made a precondition to accepting the witness' testi-
mony.46 Others suggest allowing the defense to comment on the wit-
ness' refusal,47 and one commentator advocates a stay or dismissal of
the proceedings in the event a witness refuses to submit to the court-
ordered psychiatric examination.48
The Looney court's apparent conclusion that a motion for a court-
ordered exam should never be granted was grounded, in part, on the
argument that "[i]t is for the jury to determine in the particular case
whether the particular witness is or is not telling the truth."49 But
court-ordered psychiatric exams of witnesses should not be rejected on
arbitrary exception to the general rule against court-ordered psychiatric exams. Id. at 18, 26, 240
S.E.2d at 622, 626.
39. See, e.g., State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 106, 459 P.2d 727, 731 (1969) (kidnapping);
State v. Butler, 27 NJ. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958) (homicide).
40. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 307 A.2d 796, 798 (Del. 1973); State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22,
24, 446 P.2d 116, 117 (1968). But see People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 198, 443 P.2d 794, 802, 70
Cal. Rptr. 210, 218 (1975) (court suggested that trial court should rule liberally in favor of defend-
ant and reversed as abuse of discretion trial court's denial of defendant's motion for court-ordered
exam).
41. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A.2d 530, 556 (1958).
42. See, e.g., Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971); Forbes v. State, 559
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977).
43. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (Exum, J., concurring). The Looney majority used the
phrase "compelling necessity" in ruling that the court below had not abused its discretion in deny-
ing Looney's motion. Id.
44. See M. GUTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 286-87 (1952).
45. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 177, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966).
46. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 471-72, 151 N.W.2d 157, 165 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 177, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966).
48. See Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J.
1324, 1340-41 (1950).
49. 294 N.C. at 27, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
[Vol. 57
1979] .PSYCHIA TRIC EXAMINA TIONS 455
the ground that because credibility is ultimately a matter for the jury,
allowing expert testimony about the witness' mental condition as it
bears on credibility would invade the province of the jury.50 By anal-
ogy to the issue of a defendant's sanity, also a jury question, courts
have recognized that psychiatrists may lend their special expertise to
aid the jury in assessing a person's mental condition.5 1 States that sanc-
tion court-ordered examinations of witnesses to aid in evaluating credi-
bility are concerned that witnesses with certain mental abnormalities
may fabricate or fantasize so convincingly, and with such internal con-
sistency, that without expert psychiatric testimony the jury may be un-
able to properly assess such a witness' credibility. 2 Assuming
arguendo that such convincing perjurers exist and that psychiatric ex-
amination can lead to detection of mental conditions that result in un-
usually credible perjury, fairness to the accused would seem to require
permitting a court-ordered examination of the witness in cases in which
the witness' testimony is uncorroborated and in which some evidence is
produced tending to show that the witness is mentally abnormal. The
Looney court, however, revealed more confidence in the jury's credibil-
ity-assessing acuity than have advocates of court-ordered exams.53
50. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently stated:
We conclude, therefore, that in determining whether expert medical opinion is to be
admitted into evidence the inquiry should be not whether it invades the province of the
jury, but whether the opinion expressed is really one based on the special expertise of the
expert, that is, whether the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have
an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.
State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-69, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978). See generally MCCORMICK,
supra note 29, § 13.
51. See, e.g., State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v. DeGregory, 285
N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
52. According to one commentator.
"The witness who is an unknown paranoid schizophrenic often sounds very con-
vincing. Judges and jurors are likely to accept this testimony without the slightest ques-
tion. A person suffering from such a mental state may have an obvious psychotic
paranoid delusion about one area of his thinking and not about another unrelated area;
therefore, if the testimony does not impinge on the area of this particular paranoid delu-
sion, this witness' testimony would make good sense and would not be obvious to the
casual observer. For example, if a witness has a paranoid delusion toward men, she may
give convincing testimony about a defective stairwell which causes injury to a child. The
psychiatrist, however, is aware that the delusional system in a paranoid schizophrenic is
not specifically limited to certain very narrow confines; rather, it may reflect serious dis-
turbed thinking and spurious reasoning in all areas of the patient's thinking. The quali-
fied psychiatrist would be familiar with the dynamics of such a mental state."
Mack, Forensic Psychiatry andthe Witness:A Survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 302, 306 (1958) (quot-
ing Dr. Carolyn H. Montier of the Cleveland Psychiatric Institute). See also M. GUTTMACHER &
H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 44; Davidson, Testimonial Capacity, 39 B.U.L. REv. 172, 179 (1959);
Karpman, Lying, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1949).
53. 294 N.C. at 18, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 622, 627.
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In further support of its conclusion concerning the inappropriate-
ness of court-ordered exams, the Looney court also stressed that North
Carolina allows an unrestricted attack on witness credibility during
cross-examination and collaterally. 54 In some states creation of a rule
allowing expert testimony based on a court-ordered psychiatric exami-
nation would be an exception to a general rule against collateral attacks
on a witness' mental condition.55 In North Carolina properly obtained
evidence of a witness' psychiatric abnormalities is always admissible.
56
Thus, in weighing the need for a court to order a witness to submit to a
psychiatric credibility exam, because of its estimate of the jury's capa-
bilities and the broad availability of impeachment tools, the North Car-
olina court found less reason for a court-ordered exam than have many
states.
The Looney court also concluded there had been insufficient con-
cern in other jurisdictions over the burden a court-ordered exam would
place on the witness and on the prosecutorial function.57 The court's
belief that a witness ordered to submit to psychiatric evaluation would
probably suffer humiliation, damage to his or her career, and a major
invasion of the right to privacy, and that this would have a chilling
effect on prospective witnesses' willingness to testify, was the basis of its
conclusion that this burden outweighed the need for such a court-or-
dered exam. 58 The court did not compare this burden with other bur-
densome procedures that state law already imposes on prospective
witnesses: subpoenas, sequestration, competency hearings, and cross-
examination.59 Moreover, the court's concern for possible humiliation
of the witness appears inconsistent with North Carolina cases refusing
54. Id. at 19, 27, 240 S.E.2d at 623, 626. The court's opinion would seem to leave open the
possibility that, in the event the defendant could arrange for the witness to be examined without
obtaining a court order, a psychiatrist could testify to the results. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 232
N.C. 727, 62 S.E.2d 50 (1950); Moyle v. Hopkins, 222 N.C. 33, 21 S.E.2d 826 (1942); State v.
Wright, 29 N.C. App. 752, 225 S.E.2d 645 (1976). This, in effect, happened in Looney, since
defendant used the testimony of the psychiatrist who conducted the examination of Matthews at
Matthews' request in connection with his own trial. 294 N.C. at 4, 240 S.E.2d at 614.
55. See MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 45, at 94 n.19; Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d
159, 173, 410 P.2d 838, 847, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 311 (1966).
56. 294 N.C. at 19, 240 S.E.2d at 623. See also id. at 6, 240 S.E.2d at 620 (citing 2 STANS-
BURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 38, 42, 44 (H. Brandis rev. 1973)).
57. Id. at 26-27, 240 S.E.2d at 626. The court stated that requiring a witness to submit to a
psychiatric examination "is a drastic invasion of the witness's own right to privacy. To be ordered
by a court to submit to such an examination is, in itself humiliating and potentially damaging to
the reputation and career of the witness." Id. at 27, 240 S.E.2d at 626.
58. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
59. E.g., State v. Woods, 293 N.C. 58, 235 S.E.2d 47 (1977) (competency); State v. Taylor,
280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E.2d 677 (1972) (sequestration); In re Pierce, 163 N.C. 247, 79 S.E. 507 (1913)
(subpoena). In civil actions N.C.R. Civ. P. 35 empowers the trial judge to order a party to submit
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to limit the scope of character impeachment.6" Nor is the court's con-
cern for the witness' privacy and career consistent with a case such as
Looney in which the witness is an admitted coparticipant serving a life
prison sentence at the time request for an examination is made.61 The
court's description of the burden placed on the witness seems rather to
assume that the witness is always an innocent bystander or victim. In
the plea-bargaining context, however, the witness often agrees, as in
Looney, to subject his credibility to the jury's scrutiny under cross-ex-
amination in exchange for a reduction in the charge against him.
When there is a quidpro quo of this nature, the burden of a witness
credibility exam is clearly more fairly imposed.61
Because it stopped short of laying down an absolute rule against
court-ordered psychological exams, the Looney opinion proceeded to
analyze whether the denial of defendant's motion constituted an abuse
of discretion. The court noted that Matthews had previously been ex-
amined in connection with his own trial by a psychiatrist who con-
cluded that he was competent to stand trial and not insane at the time
he allegedly murdered Looney's wife.63 The trial judge who denied
Looney's second motion that Matthews be examined again for the pur-
pose of assessing his mental condition as it might bear on credibility,
and the supreme court in reviewing that denial, seemed to take the po-
sition that "one exam is enough."'  Logically, there are serious
to a psychiatric exam if good cause for the exam is shown. Cf. Williams v. Williams, 29 N.C. App.
509, 224 S.E.2d 656, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 667, 228 S.E.2d 458 (1976) (child custody proceeding;
husband, wife, and child ordered to submit to psychiatric exam).
60. For example, North Carolina allows an unrestricted attack using the witness' prior con-
victions. Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967) (traffic viola-
tion). Other states have concluded that the value of such an unrestricted attack on the witness'
credibility is outweighed by the burden placed on the witness. See MCCORMICK, supra note 29,§ 43.
61. Matthews was serving a life sentence at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina, at the
time of the Looney trial. Brief for Appellee at 14.
62. The court apparently believed the only function of allowing the judge to consider a mo-
tion for a court-ordered exam to be a means to compel the witness to submit to an exam against
his will. The court framed the issue presented by defendant's appeal as whether the court should
"hold that a trial court in this state may require a witness, against his will, to subject himself to a
psychiatric examination." 294 N.C. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627. The facts in Looney, however, sug-
gest another function may be played by the court order. In a situation in which an alleged copar-
ticipant is testifying against his alleged partner in exchange for a reduction in charges, the witness
may actually be indifferent to undergoing psychiatric evaluation. In this context, the role of the
court order may be to overcome the State's opposition to the examination of a willing witness. In
other contexts, a witness may sensibly reject a direct request by the defense that he undergo psy-
chiatric examination, but the same witness may respect an impartial determination by the trial
judge that an exam is needed in the interests of justice.
63. See note 7 supra.
64. See 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628; Record at 18-19; note 12 supra.
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problems with this conclusion. The four occasions for the use of psy-
chiatric evaluation65 are governed by different legal standards. Thus, a
finding that a prospective witness was previously competent to stand
trial is not conclusive on the question whether he has a mental abnor-
mality bearing on credibility.66 The examining psychiatrist in the com-
petency to stand trial situation may conduct a more limited exploration
of a person's mental condition and may measure his observation of the
patient by different guidelines than if he were asked to evaluate how a
person's mental condition bears on credibility.67
Most states have found that corroborative evidence supporting the
testimony of the witness whose credibility is challenged militates
against finding there is sufficient reason for ordering a psychiatric eval-
uation of the witness' credibility.6 The quantity of corroborative evi-
dence in Looney may have justified the North Carolina Supreme
Court's finding that there had been no abuse of discretion in the denial
of defendant's motion.69 But in suggesting that court-ordered exams
65. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
66. Presumably, there are certain mental incompetents who are so incapacitated that they
would be found insane, incompetent to stand trial, and not credible as a witness. But for most
levels of mental defect a separate inquiry should be made, keeping in mind the legal standard to
be applied. See 2 STANSBURY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 38,42,44 (H. Brandis rev. 1973);
Comment, Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination as Proposed Meansfor Testing the Complainants
Competency to Allege a Sex Offense, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 651.
67. For example, a psychiatrist examining a person who has asserted an insanity defense
must focus on the person's sanity at some point in the past and will not be considering how the
person's present mental condition might bear on credibility. Psychiatrists tend to analyze a pa-
tient's mental problems in terms of thresholds in determining whether and what type of treatment
is called for, and may resort to a similar threshold analysis when asked to apply the different legal
standards for insanity, competency, and credibility. See Pollack, The Role ofPsychiatry in the Rule
of Law, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS & DEBATE 11, 18-19 (R. Bonnie
ed. 1977); Pollack, Principles ofForensic Psychiatryfor Psychiatric-Legal Opinion Making, 1971
LEGAL MED. ANN. 261. Both defendant and the State recognized in their briefs the important
difference in the goals and definitions of an exam to test criminal insanity and competency to
stand trial, and an exam to investigate the person's mental condition as it bears on credibility.
Brief for Appellant at 5; Brief for Appellee at 12. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 29, §§ 33, 6 1.
68. See, e.g., State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 24, 446 P.2d 116, 117 (1968); Brief for Appellant at
8.
69. See note 17 supra. In applying the "compelling necessity" standard the Looney court's
finding of no abuse of discretion appears inconsistent with other courts' application of analogous
standards. The court noted that defendant was able to adduce some strong evidence raising
doubts about Matthews' credibility because of his mental condition, and therefore concluded that
he failed to show a compelling necessity for the exam. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628. Other
courts, in contrast, might have required defendant's initial showing of mental abnormality as nec-
essary to pass a threshold evidentiary test used to screen out frivolous requests. See, e.g., State v.
Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 546, 498 P.2d 635, 642 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973). The
Looney opinion therefore may require defendants to walk a tightrope of producing sufficient evi-
dence that the witness has a mental condition bearing on credibility to justify an exam, but not so
much evidence that the exam will be considered unnecessary.
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can never be justified,70 the supreme court may have undervalued the
need for a psychiatric examination that can arise in special circum-
stances, overreacted to the burden such an exam imposes on certain
witnesses, and denied North Carolina trial courts a potentially effective
evidentiary tool for assessing witness credibility.7 1
KURT D. WINTERKORN
Federal Jurisdiction-Civil Rights-Monell v. Department of
Social Services: The Court Compromises on Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act' provides a federal2 cause of
action for any person whose constitutional rights have been violated
"under color of state law." Since the Supreme Court's expansive defi-
nition of "under color of state law" in Monroe v. Pape3 in 1961, the
70. For a discussion of the role of the expert psychiatric witness in the interaction of law and
modem science and an earlier reluctance of the North Carolina courts to increase reliance on
psychiatric opinion, see A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1943, 21 N.C.L. REV.
323, 348 (1943).
71. Justice Exum, in his concurring opinion, concluded, "Situations calling for the entry of
such an order would, it seems, be rare indeed. But if called for, our judges should have the power
to enter the order." 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (concurring opinion).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims is conferred upon the federal courts by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1970), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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statute has been the principal tool used by the federal judiciary to pro-
tect citizens' constitutional rights from state encroachment and to pro-
vide compensation for persons injured by constitutional violations.4
The utility of section 1983 was, however, long impaired by the holding
in Monroe that municipalities and other local governmental entities
were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and hence could not be
sued pursuant to the statute.' In Monell v. Department of Social
Services6 the Court overruled Monroe, holding that municipalities can
be sued under section 1983 when a municipal policy, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom inflicts constitutional injury.' The Court did, however,
place a significant limitation on the scope of municipal liability under
section 1983 by holding that local governments cannot be held liable on
a respondeat superior theory for the section 1983 violations of their em-
ployees.8 In addition, the Court intimated that a further limitation on
municipal liability-in the form of a qualified immunity for muncipal
defendants in section 1983 actions-may be developed in the near
future.9
Monell was initiated by several employees of the Department of
Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York
who brought a class action under section 1983 challenging, on due
process grounds, the constitutionality of a mandatory pregnancy leave
policy allegedly adopted by the Board and the Department.'° Plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as back pay for the
period of forced leave." As defendants, the complaint named the De-
partment and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the
City of New York and its Mayor. 2 The individual defendants were
4. For an extensive survey of§ 1983 law, with particular emphasis on the statute's impact on
state-fcderal relations, see Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1133 (1977).
5. 365 U.S. at 187.
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. Id. at 690.
8. Id. at 694.
9. Id. at 701.
10. Id. at 661. According to the employees' allegations, this policy arbitrarily required them
to take unpaid leaves of absence at a certain stage of their pregnancies, regardless of their physical
capability to work beyond that stage. Id.
11. Id. Plaintiffs were required to quit work approximately one month before it would have
become medically necessary for them to do so. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. 436 U.S. at 661.
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sued solely in their "official capacity," meaning that any monetary re-
covery from them was to be paid out of municipal funds.' 3
While the Monell case was pending in federal district court,'4 the
Supreme Court, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur,'5 struck
down, on due process grounds, a mandatory pregnancy leave policy
similar to that involved in Monell. The district court recognized that
under Lafleur the New York City policy in Monell was unconstitu-
tional, 6 but dismissed the action nonetheless, holding that any attempt
to secure back pay from the City under section 1983, either by suing the
Board, the Department, or the City directly, or by suing the individual
defendants in their official capacity, was barred by the doctrine of mu-
nicipal immunity announced in Monroe v. Pape.7 The district court's
judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit on similar grounds.' 8
The Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision based entirely on
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, reversed the judgments of
the lower courts, holding that municipalities and other local govern-
mental entities may, in some circumstances, be held liable under sec-
tion 1983. In so doing, the Court rejected the interpretation of the
legislative history of section 1983 that had formed the sole basis of the
Monroe Court's holding that local governments were immune from lia-
bility under the statute."
Section 1983 originated as section one of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,20 sometimes known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.2' During consid-
eration of the Act, the House rejected an amendment, offered by Sena-
tor Sherman, that would have imposed liability on towns and counties
13. For a discussion of official capacity suits, see notes 38-40 and 47-48 and accompanying
text infra.
14. 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
15. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
16. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
17. Id. The court held plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because
both the Board and the Department had abolished their mandatory pregnancy leave policies. Id.
18. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. The Monroe Court expressly refused to consider policy reasons for or against municipal
immunity. 365 U.S. at 191.
20. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
21. The general purpose of the Act was to suppress violence in the post-Civil War South,
where gangs of Klan members were allegedly terrorizing blacks and white Republicans. For a
vivid description of the situation the Act was intended to remedy, see the remarks of Senator
Sherman, CONG. GLOaE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 154-58 (1871).
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for damage done to their inhabitants "by persons riotously and tumul-
tuously assembled."22 The Monroe Court interpreted the House rejec-
tion of the Sherman Amendment as an indication of Congress' intent
that municipalities not be held liable under any portion of the Act, in-
cluding section 1983.23 In Monell, the Court concluded, after a thor-
ough reexamination of the legislative history of the Act, that Monroe
had erred in its interpretation of legislative intent and that the 1871
Congress, despite its rejection of the Sherman Amendment, had in-
tended that muncipalities be included as "persons" within section
1983.24
The key to the Court's opinion in Monell is the distinction drawn
between municipal liability under the Sherman Amendment and that
imposed by section 1983. The Sherman Amendment was a rather dras-
tic piece of "riot act" legislation. It provided that towns and counties
would be liable for all damage done to person or property byprivate
persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled," even if the govern-
ment had no prior knowledge of the impending riot.25 According to
the Court, section one of the Act (now section 1983), on the other hand,
imposed liability only for the municipality's own constitutional
violations.
Therefore the Court did not find in the debates on the Sherman
Amendment a complete bar to municipal liability under section 1983.26
22. Id. at 800. The full text of the Sherman Amendment is included in the appendix to the
majority opinion in MAonell. 436 U.S. at 702.
23. 365 U.S. at 191. According to the Monroe Court's interpretation, the 1871 Congress con-
sidered itself constitutionally powerless to impose § 1983 liability on towns and counties, because
local governments were instrumentalities of state, not federal, law. Id. at 190.
24. 436 U.S. at 690.
25. According to its sponsor, the purpose of the Sherman Amendment was to compensate for
the state courts' inability to cope with the Klan problem. Senator Sherman noted that, despite the
prevalence of Klan violence, indictments of Klan members were rare. And even when an indict-
ment was handed down, a jury of sympathetic peers would usually render a verdict of not guilty.
Sherman felt that his amendment, by holding the town or county liable for Klan violence, would
encourage the local citizenry to take action to suppress the Klan. Sherman claimed that a similar
law had been enacted in England to quell the widespread social disorder following the Norman
Conquest, and that several states had enacted statutes to the same effect. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 760, 761 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
26. The most prominent objection to the Sherman Amendment was that it would impose on
towns and counties an obligation to protect their citizens and their property from rioters. In effect,
the Sherman Amendment would have required local government entities to establish police forces
to keep the peace. Several congressmen believed that since a local government was an instrumen-
tality of state law, the federal government had no constitutional power to impose such an obliga-
tion on towns and counties. See, e.g., id. at 788-89 (remarks of Rep. Kerr). Justice Brennan,
reasoning from established case law existing at the time of the 1871 debates, concluded that the
Congressmen would not have perceived a similar constitutional problem in simply requiring local
governments to abide by the Constitution in their own actions. 436 U.S. at 679-82. Furthermore,
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They did find, however, in the rejection of the Sherman Amendment, a
significant limitation on that liability. On the basis of the plain lan-
guage of the statute and "Congress' rejection of the only form of vicari-
ous liability presented to it," 7 the Court concluded that the 1871
Congress did not intend municipalities to be vicariously liable under
traditional principles of tort law for the section 1983 violations of their
employees. 8 Instead, the Court held that a municipality can be named
as a defendant in a section 1983 action only when some municipal pol-
icy, ordinance, regulation, or custom inflicts a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. 9
The Court's opinion in Monell concluded with a cursory discus-
sion of the possibility that a limited form of immunity may be con-
ferred upon municipal defendants in section 1983 actions.3 Though
the Court chose to "express no views on the scope of municipal immu-
nity beyond holding that municipal bodies . . . cannot be entitled to an
absolute immunity,"'" the possibility of a qual/fed immunity for local
governments-similar to that granted to governmental officials in sec-
tion 1983 actions-was implicitly left open.
Though Monroe v. Pape greatly expanded the scope of section
198332 by interpreting "under color of state law" to include the misuse
of power by state officials,33 the Monroe Court also placed a major re-
striction on the utility of section 1983 with its holding that municipali-
ties were not "persons" for section 1983 purposes and hence could not
Brennan pointed to certain passages in the debates that showed "unequivocally" that Congress
intended municipalities to be held liable under § 1983. Id. at 683-90.
27. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57.
28. Id. at 694. Mr. Justice Stevens did not join this portion of the Court's opinion, because it
was "merely advisory" and not necessary to resolve the issues presented by Monell. Id. at 714
(concurring opinion).
29. Id. at 690.
30. Id. at 701.
31. Id.
32. Prior to Monroe, § 1983 had been interpreted narrowly by the courts and, as a result, only
a handful of § 1983 actions were successfully maintained. For a brief analysis of the statute's slow
beginnings, see Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 4, at 1156-61.
The Monroe decision paved the way for a phenomenal increase in the use of § 1983. Though
there are apparently no statistics on the exact number of § 1983 actions brought each year, one
authority estimates that while approximately 300 § 1983 claims were filed in 1960, over 12,000
such claims were filed in 1977. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals To Strengthen the
Section 1983 Damage Remedy For Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978).
33. In Monroe, plaintiffs sought monetary relief under § 1983 for injuries allegedly inflicted
by Chicago police officers. Plaintiffs alleged that the officers broke into their home without a
warrant, ransacked the house, and took one of the plaintiffs to a police station where he was
interrogated for 10 hours without being placed under arrest or taken before a magistrate. 365 U.S.
at 169. The defendants argued that § 1983 was inapplicable to these facts because the officers were
1979]
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be sued pursuant to the statute. An attempt in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno34 to limit Monroe to its facts, by arguing that the immunity ap-
plied only to actions for damages and not to suits for equitable relief,
was unsuccessful. Monroe and Kenosha combined to produce a doc-
trine of absolute municipal immunity from any action, legal or equita-
ble, brought under section 1983.35
From its inception, the municipal immunity doctrine was unpopu-
lar both with commentators, who criticized it frequently,36 and with the
lower federal courts, which devised several means to circumvent
Monroe. The Supreme Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence37
provided one method of awarding injunctive relief against a municipal-
ity despite the Monroe immunity doctrine.38 This was accomplished
through the familiar fiction of "official capacity" suits. The plaintiff,
seeking an injunction against some unconstitutional municipal action,
would simply bring suit against the responsible individual governmen-
tal employee in his official capacity. By ordering the "official capacity"
defendant to cease enforcement of the unconstitutional municipal prac-
tice, the court would reach a result tantamount to an injunction against
the municipality itself. All the courts of appeals agreed that "official
capacity" suits for equitable relief were cognizable under section 1983,
despite their similarity to actions directly against the governmental en-
tity.39 The Supreme Court itself gave implicit recognition to the "offi-
cial capacity" method of circumventing Monroe while ostensibly
adhering to the municipal immunity doctrine.4 0  Thus, well before
Monell, injunctive relief under section 1983 could be awarded against a
municipality, albeit indirectly.
acting contrary to state law, not pursuant to it, and hence the "under color of state law" require-
nient was not satisfied. Id. at 172. The Court rejected this argument, holding that "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is taken 'under color of' state law.'" Id. at 184 (quoting Justice
Stone in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
34. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
35. The municipal immunity doctrine has been the subject of extensive commentary. For an
exceptionally thorough and well-documented analysis, see Levin, The Section 1983 Municopal Im-
munity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977).
36. Eg., Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 134-35 (1972); Comment, Developing GovernmentalLiabili , Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
38. See generally Levin, supra note 35, at 1496-504.
39. See id. at 1501 n.67.
40. In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976), a munic-
ipal workers union named the City of Charlotte, the City Council, and the individual council
members in their official capacity as defendants in a suit to obtain an injunction ordering that
union dues be withheld from members' paychecks. The Court held that the municipal immunity
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The lower courts continued their efforts to circumvent the munici-
pal immunity doctrine by devising monetary damage remedies for per-
sons injured by unconstitutional municipal action. Much of this
activity centered around the judicial creation of a cause of action
against local governmental entities similar to that created by the Court
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.4" In Bivens, the Court held that a cause of action could be
implied from the fourth amendment, giving a person whose fourth
amendment rights are violated by a federal officer a monetary damage
remedy against the offending officer.42 By analogy to Bivens, commen-
tators argued that a similar cause of action against local governmental
entities could be implied from the fourteenth amendment.43  By pro-
ceeding under a Bivens-type cause of action, rather than section 1983, a
person injured by municipal constitutional violations could evade the
restrictions imposed by the section 1983 municipal immunity doctrine
and thereby obtain compensation from the municipality in the form of
money damages. By the time Monell was decided, four federal courts
of appeals had accepted the Bivens analogy and found a cause of action
against local governmental entities implied under the fourteenth
amendment.' Three others intimated that such an action might be
maintained,45 while one refused to find an implied cause of action.46
doctrine barred suit against the City or the Council but that the suit could nonetheless be main-
tained against the individual council members in their official capacity. Id. at 284 n.L. In consid-
ering this decision, one commentator noted that "the Court did not pause to explain what
conceivable interests could be furthered by such a ruling." Levin, supra note 35, at 1502.
41. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
42. Id. at 397.
43. Eg., Hundt, Suing Mun'cipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 770 (1975); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municflalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89
HARV. L. REv. 923 (1976). The movement toward the creation of a Bivens-type cause of action
against municipalities was fueled by language in the majority and concurring opinions in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 514, 516, that seemed to indicate that the Court would find no
obstacle to such a development.
44. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 1978) (decided one day before Monell; hold-
ing that plaintiff, victim of officially condoned police harassment, could maintain action against
city); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977) (public official's job termi-
nated without due process), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975) (employee
dismissed without due process); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) (citizen's
fourth amendment rights violated by city building inspectors).
45. Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stan-
ton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d
803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975).
46. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37,43 (lst Cir. 1977). Finding a Bivens-type cause of action on
the facts of Kosika would have required the court to impose vicarious liability on municipalities
for the constitutional violations of their employees. The court indicated that they may have found
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Another method of circumventing Monroe in order to award dam-
ages to persons injured by unconstitutional municipal action was
adopted by two courts of appeals. These courts extended the "official
capacity" method of recovery to actions for money damages by order-
ing "official capacity" defendants to obtain compensatory payments
from the funds of the governmental entity that would have been im-
mune had it been sued directly.47 These decisions were cited promi-
nently in petitioners' brief in Monell, providing a basis for the core of
their argument that the individual defendants, sued in their official ca-
pacity, could be ordered to obtain funds from the municipal treasury in
order to compensate the employees for the period of illegal forced
leave.48
The willingness of some courts to extend the "official capacity"
method of recovery to actions for monetary damages, like the creation
of a Bivens-type cause of action against municipalities, was illustrative
of the lower courts' desire to fashion some means of compensation for
constitutional injury inflicted by local governments, and of their con-
tinued dissatisfaction with the municipal immunity doctrine. By ap-
proaching the matter straightforwardly and overruling Monroe
outright, the Court has done much to clarify an area of the law that had
become seriously confused as a result of the lower courts' attempts to
circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine. Some aspects of the
Court's opinion suggest, however, that this area will still be a contro-
versial one. The Court's refusal to impose respondeat superior liability
on local governments for the constitutional torts of their agents, 49 and
the suggestion that local governments may eventually be accorded a
qualified immunity from section 1983 liability,5" suggest that section
a Bivens-type cause of action had the municipality been directly responsible for the alleged consti-
tutional violation. Id. at 45. The argument that the fourteenth amendment created a Bivens-type
cause of action against local governments was before the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), but the Court refused to decide the issue because it had
been raised only at oral argument and had not been fully briefed. Id. at 278.
47. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975) (award of back pay from public
funds); Incarcerated Men v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (attorneys' fees).
48. Brief for Petitioners at 32-69. The court of appeals decision in Monell rejected this argu-
ment, drawing a distinction between "official capacity" suits for equitable relief and those for
money damages by analogy to a similar distinction in Supreme Court eleventh amendment cases.
532 F.2d 259, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1976). This analogy, however, was tenuous; the Court had, in an
earlier case, explicitly stated that the language of § 1983 did not permit any distinction based on
"the nature of relief sought." City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 513. The Kenosha language
effectively precluded the Court from adopting the court of appeals rationale in Monell, as Mr.
Justice Powell recognized in his concurrence. 436 U.S. at 712 (concurring opinion).
49. 436 U.S. at 694.
50. Id. at 701.
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1983 will remain a hollow remedy for many persons injured by uncon-
stitutional municipal action.
The respondeat superior limitation is especially significant, and
strong policy reasons argue against it. Under the Monell standard of
municipal liability, a local government will be subject to section 1983
liability only when it is direcdy responsible for a constitutional vila-
tion, such as when some officially adopted policy or ordinance inflicts
constitutional injury. A local government will not, under Monell, be
liable for its employees' ultra vires constitutional torts, that is, those
committed without governmental authority. In practical terms this
means that victims of unreasonable searches and seizures, police bru-
tality, and other forms of police misconduct will still be unable to seek
compensation for their injuries by bringing a section 1983 action
against the employing governmental entity. The only avenue of relief
for these persons is an action against the offending officer, which has
long been criticized as being ineffective from both a compensatory and
deterrence standpoint.51
When a citizen sues a police officer alleging some form of police
misconduct, several factors combine to make a jury verdict for the
plaintiff unlikely. The officer is protected by a qualified immunity, 2
which insulates him from liability in all but the most egregious of situa-
tions.53 Also, the jury is naturally reluctant to levy a damage judgment
against the policeman, whose job is difficult, dangerous, and not very
lucrative.54 Even in those situations in which a judgment against the
officer is obtained, the plaintiffs prospects of compensation are subject
to the possibility that the officer may be judgment-proof.5 5 Commenta-
tors have argued that the compensatory purpose of section 1983 would
51. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 26.03 (1976); Kates
& Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-42; Newman, supra note 32, at 447-67; Comment, supra 'note 36, at
1209.
52. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
53. The immunity protects the officer from liability for action taken in good faith and with
reasonable grounds to believe in the constitutionality of the action. In practice, this qualified
immunity often has the effect of an absolute one. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
54. The Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Federal District Judge for the District of Connecticut, writes
from his own experience: "A jury understandably succumbs easily to the argument, stated or
implied, that recovery should be denied because the damages must come from the paycheck of a
hard-working, underpaid police officer." Newman, supra note 32, at 456.
55. See, e.g., Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-37; Comment, supra note 36, at 1209.
Professor Davis has summed up the situation with this description of a fictional conversation
between an attorney and a client who has been injured by police misconduct:
What the lawyer says to the bruised and battered client is something like this: "I believe
you when you say the policeman beat you up. A suit against him will cost several thou-
sand dollars, and we have about one chance in ten to get a judgment. If we get it, the
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be much better served by an action directly against the governmental
entity, on a respondeat superior theory.56 Such an action would also
serve as a more effective deterrent to police misconduct than the action
against the individual officer, because high government officials would
be influenced to supervise their employees more closely, and to disci-
pline officers who violate citizens' constitutional rights. 7
The Monell Court did not consider any of these policy arguments
in reaching its decision not to impose respondeat superior liability on
municipalities. Instead that decision was based solely on prior case law
interpretation of the statutory language of section 1983, combined with
Congress' rejection in 1871 of the Sherman Amendment.58 In Rizzo v.
Goode,59 the Court interpreted the language of section 1983 to preclude
the imposition of respondeat superior liability on a section 1983 defend-
ant, holding that liability could result only when the defendant had
acted affirmatively to "cause" the constitutional violation.60 Defendant
in Rizzo, however, was an individual supervisory official who, under a
respondeat superior theory, would be held personally liable for any
constitutional injury inflicted by subordinates. Arguably, the case for
vicarious liability is stronger when the defendant is a governmental en-
tity which, unlike the individual official, is capable of absorbing the
cost of employees' liability and spreading it across the entire
amount may be several hundred dollars. And we have no assurance of collecting it. Do
you want me to file an action?"
K. DAVIS, supra note 51, at 595.
56. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 51; Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 136-44; Newman, supra
note 32, at 455-58. This argument was adopted by some lower federal courts that found respondeat
superior liability under a Bivens-type cause of action. E.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435
F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155
(N.D. I11. 1975). In Santiago, the court noted that the action against the individual officer rarely
results in compensation for the injured citizen and added: "[Tihe employer, rather than the in-
jured party, is in a better position to absorb the costs, insure against them and distribute the cost to
society." 435 F. Supp. at 148.
57. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 51, at 597; Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 140; Comment,
supra note 36, at 1209. It has been argued that a direct action against the municipality may have
the opposite effect. Because, under a respondeat superior standard, the officer would not be per-
sonally liable for unconstitutional misconduct, it is contended that the officer would no longer
have any incentive to refrain from such action. Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 393 n.1 I (E.D.
Pa. 1977). This seems highly implausible. First, the present inefficacy of the remedy against the
officer throws great doubt on its deterrent effect. Second, though an officer would not be person-
ally liable under a respondeat superior standard, he would be subject to disciplinary action by
superiors. The threat of losing one's job would probably be a more effective deterrent than the
threat of a lawsuit which, as experience has shown, rarely results in an adverse judgment.
58. 436 U.S. at 691-95.
59. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
60. Id. at 371. The facts of Rizzo are discussed in note 71 infra.
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community.6'
The Court's legislative history argument is also vulnerable because
of the difference between the nature of liability imposed on municipali-
ties by the Sherman Amendment and that imposed by a respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability. The Sherman Amendment
would have held towns and counties liable for damage done by private
citizens "riotously and tumultuously assembled." In contrast, a respon-
deat superior standard would impose liability only when the municipal-
ity's own agents inflict constitutional injury. Because of this distinction,
it is indeed questionable to infer from the House rejection of the Sher-
man Amendment that the congressmen would have similarly rejected a
proposal to hold local governments liable for the constitutional torts of
their employees.
Policy considerations, though not articulated in the opinion, may
also have influenced the Court in enunciating the Monell standard of
municipal liability. Many of the lower courts that found a Bivens-type
cause of action against local governments stopped short of imposing
vicarious liability on municipalities.62 These courts, of course, did not
consider the language of section 1983 or the statute's legislative history
when making that decision, but instead relied solely on policy
rationales.
The primary concern expressed by these lower courts was that re-
spondeat superior liability might decimate municipal treasuries, many
of which already are strained almost to the breaking point.63 Others
61. Though the language of§ 1983 does not differentiate between governmental and natural
"persons" in this fashion, support for such a distinction can be found in the statute's legislative
history. In the only portion of the debates that speaks directly to the issue of how courts should
construe the language of § 1983, Representative Shellabarger emphasized that the section is "re-
medial" in nature and that "such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871). Given the remedial inefficacy of§ 1983 for persons injured
by police misconduct, a finding of respondeat superior liability under the statute might be just the
type of liberal construction envisioned by its authors.
62. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1978); Owen v. City of Independence,
560 F.2d 925, 933 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118
(1978); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1977); Riley v. City of Minneapolis,
436 F. Supp. 954, 956-57; Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to find Bivens-type cause of
action because case involved vicarious liability); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975)
(finding Bivens-type cause of action when city ordinance was alleged to be unconstitutional);
Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (suggesting, but not adopting, standard of
municipal liability similar to that in Monell). A few lower federal courts, however, did find re-
spondeat superior liability under a Bivens-type cause of action. See cases cited note 56 supra.
63. E.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1978); Adekalu v. New York City,
431 F. Supp. 812, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Judge Kaufman, writing for the court of appeals in
Turpin, stated: "[Bly permitting liability only in those instances where the municipality is directly
responsible for the unconstitutional behavior, the drain on the local fisc will be minimized. In a
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questioned the need for this liability,' given the practice, now adopted
in several states, of government indemnification of officers who suffer
adverse judgments in section 1983 actions.65 According to these courts,
this practice substantially alleviates the problem of judgment-proof po-
licemen, and guarantees that plaintiffs injured by police misconduct
will be compensated.66 Imposing vicarious liability on municipalities
by judicial fiat also would have entailed a substantial federal reorder-
ing of local affairs, thereby raising serious questions of federalism. 67
Perhaps the Court considered the decision to impose respondeat
superior liability on municipalities one to be made by the states, by
amendment to their respective tort claims acts.
Though the respondeat superior limitation will insulate local gov-
ernments from liability for their officers' ultra vires misconduct, it
should not apply to those cases in which a municipality (or its policy-
making officials) has, for instance, actively encouraged police abuse of
citizens' constitutional rights, or has tolerated such abuse in the face of
a pattern of police misconduct. 68 Governmental action of this kind
would rise to the level of a "policy" or "custom" of advocating police
misconduct, and would then fit squarely within the standard of munici-
pal liability announced in Monell. Lower courts, in delineating the de-
gree of governmental involvement necessary to find liability under a
Bipens-type cause of action, have recognized this distinction and have
circuit whose contours include the City of New York, we are not insensitive to the financial plight
of local governmental bodies." 579 F.2d at 165 (footnote omitted).
64. E.g., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
65. For a complete listing of the various indemnification statutes, see Freed, Executive Official
Immunityfor Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526, 564
n.182 (1978).
66. Eg., Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389, 392 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1977). This claim is debatable.
Many of the statutes apply only if the officer was acting in good faith. Consequently, they do not
provide indemnification for policemen suffering adverse judgments in § 1983 actions who, because
of the qualified immunity, must have been acting maliciously in order to incur § 1983 liability.
Kates & Kouba, supra note 36, at 137. Also, the system of indemnification has no effect on the
jury's natural bias in favor of the police officer. K. DAVIs, supra note 51, at 595. Thus, many of
the inadequacies of the action against the individual officer remain, despite the availability of
indemnification.
67. Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977). The Court has become increasingly
sensitive to federal reordering of local affairs. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See generally Developments in the
Laiv--Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 4.
68. A paradigmatic case is suggested by a recent report of the Tennessee division of the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, that found, after an investigation of numerous police brutality claims in
Memphis, Tennessee, that "'police misconduct [in Memphis] is both pervasive and uncon-
trolled.'" NEWSWEEK, September 18, 1978, at 35 (quoting U.S. Civil Rights Commission). The
Memphis Police Department is now being investigated by a subcommittee of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. Id.
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indicated that liability would attach when a local government has en-
couraged, or tacitly approved of, police abuse of constitutional rights.6 9
The conclusion that liability can be imposed under section 1983
for mere "tolerance" of police misconduct may be challenged, however,
on the basis of language in Rizzo v. Goode70 in which the Court stated
that some "affirmative link" between the defendant and the constitu-
tional violation was necessary to satisfy the section 1983 causation re-
quirement.71 Rizzo involved an attempt to impose section 1983 liability
on supervisory officials by alleging that they had failed to supervise
their subordinate officers to prevent constitutional violations. The fact
situation faced by the Court in Rizzo is, however, distinguishable from
that posed when a plaintiff proves a pattern of police misconduct,
thereby raising the inference that municipal officials, by acquiescing in
the face of this pattern, had adopted a de facto policy of advocating
police abuse. In Rizzo such a pattern was alleged but not proved, and
the Court emphasized that only a few instances of police misconduct
had been shown actually to have occurred.72 When unconstitutional
police behavior is more prevalent, 73 a different result than that reached
69. E.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1978); Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 n.9 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct.
3118 (1978); Riley v. City of Minneapolis, 436 F. Supp. 954, 957 (D. Minn. 1977); Adekalu v. New
York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). This issue is discussed in Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130,
1135-36 (D. Conn. 1978), apparently the first lower court opinion to consider whether a munici-
pality may be held liable for tolerance of police misconduct under the Monell standard. In that
case, the court expressed some doubt whether such an action could be maintained in light of Rizzo.
Id. at 1136. The decision appears, however, to be based on a faulty assumption concerning the
precise holding in Rizzo. At the outset of its discussion, the court wrote: "What the Supreme
Court [in R izzo] found insufficient was the supervisors' 'failure to act in the face of a statistical
pattern' of unconstitutional action by subordinates." Id. at 1135 (citation omitted). In fact, a
"statistical pattern" of police misconduct was not proved in Rizzo-a factor the Court found to be
of some importance. See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
71. 423 U.S. at 371. Rizzo involved a class action brought by a group of Philadelphia citizens
against various municipal officials alleging, among other things, that the officials had failed to take
adequate measures to correct a "pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by
police officers." Id. at 366. The Court denied plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief partly because
the constitutional violations had actually been committed by subordinate officers, not by the
named defendants who, as supervisory officials, played no affirmative role in the unconstitutional
conduct. Id. at 371.
72. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rizzo, noted that though the plaintiffs
had complained of "an 'unacceptably high' number of those incidents [of police misconduct],"
they had proved only a small number, "some 20 in all ... occurring. . . in a city of 3 million
inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen." Id. at 373. Justice Rehnquist considered it significant that
"there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree
from that which exists elsewhere." Id. at 375.
73. As a practical matter, the problems of presenting adequate proof in this situation will be
considerable, unless the plaintiff can produce authoritative documentation of widespread police
misconduct such as that discussed in note 68 supra. See, e.g, Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp.
1130, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1978) (court discusses procedural requirements for bringing such an ac-
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in Rizzo may be based on recognition of the lack of any substantive
difference between passive tolerance of widespread police misconduct
and affirmative advocacy of such misconduct. In addition, concerns of
federalism played an important role in the Court's decision in Rizzo
because of the interference in the municipality's affairs that would have
resulted from the injunction sought by plaintiffs.74 Similar concerns
would not be raised by awarding damages to persons injured by spe-
cific police abuse. These damage awards would influence municipal
officials to alter their procedures in order to deter police misconduct,
but they could do so on their own terms rather than those of a federal
court judge.
Another issue that should attract the immediate attention of the
lower courts concerns the development of a qualified immunity for mu-
nicipal defendants in section 1983 actions.7 Presumably this would be
similar to immunities granted government officials in section 1983 ac-
tions,76 and would protect a local government from liability for action
taken in good faith and with reasonable grounds to believe that the
action was constitutional.77 The desirability of such an immunity is,
however, questionable. Not only is a qualified immunity for munici-
palities not justified by the rationales used by the Court to support offi-
cial immunity in past decisions, but it also would have the effect of
eviscerating the section 1983 damage remedy for persons injured by
unconstitutional municipal action.
In deciding some of the official immunity cases under section 1983,
the Court has simply adopted the tort immunity accorded the various
officials at common law,7" apparently with the belief that the 1871 Con-
gress did not intend to disturb existing common law doctrines when
enacting section 1983.79 The same approach to the issue of municipal
tion and notes that "[t]he standard for municipal liability predicated on inaction of senior person-
nel must be frankly acknowledged as difficult to meet").
74. 423 U.S. at 378-80.
75. Both the majority and concurring opinions in Monell mentioned the possibility of such a
development. 436 U.S. at 701, 713-14.
76. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state execu-
tives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers). For a survey of the Court's action on
§ 1983 official immunity, see Freed, supra note 65.
77. The Court explained this standard in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,421 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951).
79. In finding judges absolutely immune under § 1983, the Court wrote: "The legislative rec-
ord gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common law immuni-
ties. . . . We presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
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immunity is unavailable, however, because under nineteenth century
common law a municipality was absolutely immune for any activity
that could subject it to a section 1983 claim.80 Though common law
doctrines regarding municipal tort liability have recently been abro-
gated in most jurisdictions,8" local governments still retain absolute im-
munity for any tort liability arising from the exercise of "discretionary
functions,"82 which include any policy-making or legislative activity.
Thus, even under contemporary notions of municipal tort liability, a
municipality would be absolutely immune for any activity cognizable
under section 1983. This proves further the futility of looking to tort
doctrines to justify any form of municipal immunity under section
1983.
Policy considerations have also played a major role in the Court's
past official immunity decisions.83 First, the Court has felt that some
form of immunity was needed to ameliorate the unfairness of imposing
personal liability on officials who were merely doing their job in good
faith and without any intention to inflict constitutional injury.8 4 Con-
sequently, the Court has required that officials must have been acting
maliciously or without reasonable grounds to believe in the constitu-
tionality of their actions in order to incur section 1983 liability. Sec-
ond, the Court has feared that the threat of personal liability might
chill an official's proper exercise of discretion" or might even deter citi-
zens from pursuing public service.86
These concerns are significantly alleviated when a municipality is
made the defendant. Indeed, municipal liability provides a refreshing
80. Under common law doctrines prevailing during the nineteenth century, a municipality's
liability in tort depended upon the type of activity that gave rise to the claim. See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 977-87 (4th ed. 1971). If the activity was of a "pro-
prietary" nature - ie. similar to that performed by a private corporation - the local government
enjoyed no immunity. Examples of proprietary activities included the municipal operation of a
public utility, ferry, airport, or garage. Id. at 980-81. But municipalities were absolutely immune
from any liability arising from its involvement in uniquely "governmental" activities, such as
passing laws or implementing governmental policies, id. at 979, the only activities that would give
rise to a § 1983 claim under the Monell standard of municipal liability.
81. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 25.00 to .00-2.
82. Id. § 25.13. The justification for the discretionary function exception is that the judiciary
should not interfere with legislative freedom by levying damage judgments against local govern-
ments when legislative decisions cause personal injury. Id. This separation of powers argument
is, of course, inapplicable to the issue of municipal immunity under § 1983 because the very
purpose of the statute is to ensure federal court supervision over local affairs.
83. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974).
84. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
85. Id.
86. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
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solution to the problems of unfairness and potential deterrence posed
by official liability. Holding a municipality responsible for constitu-
tional violations will remove the harshness of imposing liability on in-
dividual officials and will instead spread the cost of constitutional
injury among all the community's taxpayers as an expense of govern-
ment. Moreover, though some government officials may be inhibited
by the possible impact of their actions on the municipal treasury, the
chilling effect would surely not be as great as that attendant to personal
liability.87
There may, however, be another policy reason justifying a quali-
fied immunity from municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. Mr.
Justice Powell noted in his concurrence that such an immunity may be
necessary to "remove some of the harshness of liability for good-faith
failure to predict the often uncertain course of constitutional adjudica-
tion."88 Though this is a genuine concern, the Court should be wary of
any rationale supporting a qualified immunity for municipalities. Past
experience with similar immunities for government officials has shown
that, in practice, a qualified immunity often has the effect of an abso-
lute one.89 This is because the qualified immunity protects government
officials unless their actions are contrary to "settled" constitutional
law.90 Because few areas of law are clearly "settled," the official who
violates constitutional rights can almost always hide behind the quali-
fied immunity.9 Should the Court find that municipalities in section
87. Note, supra note 43, at 957. In the first appellate decision to consider the scope of muni-
cipal immunity after Monell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to an
opposite conclusion. Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, No. 76-1129 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978). The
court held that a school district was entitled to the same qualified immunity from § 1983 liability
as was its school board members because "conscientious board members will be just as concerned
that their decisions or actions might create a liability for damages [against] the board or the local
entity as they are that they would against themselves .... The restriction on the exercise of in-
dependent judgment is the same." Id.; see slip op. at 5. Earlier courts of appeals decisions, which
questioned the applicability of the deterrence argument to the case of a municipal defendant in a
Bivens-type cause of action, suggest that there will be a split of opinion on this issue among the
circuits. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 1977), vacatedfor
reconsideration in view of Monell, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978) ("primary justification for the defense of
good faith. . . ,to insure that public officials will not hesitate to discharge their duties out of fear
of personal monetary liability .. . .does not exist where the city itself will bear the monetary
award"); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (Ist Cir. 1977) ("[w]hile the imposition of damages
liability on a political subdivision could conceivably result in chilling the performance of some
official functions, the likelihood of substantial inhibition is not great since the officials will not be
held personally liable").
88. 436 U.S. at 713.
89. Freed, supra note 65, at 564.
90. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978).
91. Freed, supra note 65, at 564. The effect of the "settled law" concept can be seen in the
Court's recent decision in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). In that case, plaintiff, a
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1983 actions are protected by a qualified immunity based on the "set-
tled law" concept, the decision in Monell may well be "'drained of
meaning.' "92 Such an immunity would largely emasculate the section
1983 damage remedy, making it extremely difficult for citizens to be
compensated for constitutional injury inflicted by local governments.
The remedial purpose of section 1983 demands that at most only mini-
mal immunity93 be accorded municipal defendants in section 1983
actions.
In Monell, the Court finally responded to years of judicial and
scholarly criticism of the municipal immunity doctrine by overruling
Monroe v. Pape and holding that local governments may be subject to
liability under section 1983. The decision can best be seen as a com-
promise between two extremes-the total municipal immunity of
Monroe on the one hand, and full municipal liability, including respon-
deal superior liability, on the other. The Court settled for a standard of
municipal liability midway between those two, similar to standards
adopted by a number of lower federal courts in Bivens-type causes of
action. The issue not resolved in Monell is the scope of the qualified
immunity for municipal defendants in section 1983 actions. The lower
courts first considering this issue should recognize that such an immu-
nity could have an extremely damaging effect on the remedial function
of section 1983, and, accordingly, should restrict the scope of the
immunity.
THOMAS L. ALLEN
state prisoner, alleged that prison officials had violated his first amendment rights by interfering
with his outgoing mail. The Court held that the officials were immune under § 1983 because
"there was no 'clearly established' First and Fourteenth Amendment right with respect to the
correspondence of convicted prisoners in 1971-1972 [when the violations occurred]." Id. at 565.
92. 436 U.S. at 701 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)). Defendants in
Monell, for example, would be completely absolved of liability under § 1983 because the Court's
decision in La/leur was handed down three years after the alleged constitutional violations
occurred.
93. One author has suggested that municipal immunity be limited to those situations in
which potential liability looms so great that it poses a threat to the continued operation of the
municipality. Note, supra note 43, at 958. As an example, the author posits a case in which blacks
bring an action against al illegally segregated school system, seeking damages for reduced earning
capacity totaling millions of dollars. Id.
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Taxation-Net Gift Transfer of Appreciated Real Property
Held Not To Give Rise to Taxable Gain for the Donor
Section 2502(d) of the Internal Revenue Code places the primary
liability for payment of gift taxes on the donor.' Frequently, however,
donors do not have sufficient liquid assets at the time of the contem-
plated gift to pay the resulting gift taxes, or do not want to disturb their
personal liquidity positions. To solve this problem they may make the
gift conditional on the donee's agreement to pay the gift taxes, or stipu-
late that the gift taxes be paid out of the gift property. The Internal
Revenue Service has recognized the validity of these arrangements for
gift tax purposes and has sanctioned the use of a "net gift" gift tax
computation method in such cases, which reduces the amount of the
taxable gift by the amount of gift taxes the donee is obligated to pay.2
1. I.R.C. § 2502(d) reads as follows: "The tax imposed by section 2501 [the gift tax] shall be
paid by the donor." I.R.C. § 6324(b) provides that if the donor does not make timely payment of
the gift tax the tax will become a lien on the gift made and the primary liability for the payment of
the gift tax will shift to the donee.
2. The net gift method of valuation of property for gift tax purposes is spelled out in Rev.
Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310, that superseded the original ruling in Rev. Rul. 71-232, 197 1-1 C.B.
275. These provide that the gift tax paid by the donee may be deducted from the value of the
transferred property if it can be shown that the payment of the gift tax by the donee is an express
or implied condition of the transfer. The amount of the tax is computed using this net value of the
gift property. The final tax result depends on two variables: the taxable value of the gift (which
depends on the amount of tax paid) and the amount of tax paid (which in turn depends on the
taxable value of the gift). The ruling provides the following algebraic formula to reach a solution
for the amount that will be netted from the value of the gift to produce the net gift that is taxed:
Tentative Tax
.= True Tax CT)
I + Rate of Tax
The "Tentative Tax" is the tax computed on the amount of the taxable gift. The "Rate of Tax" is
the rate at which the amount of the taxable gift that exceeds the tax bracket amount is taxed. The
"True Tax" is the amount to be deducted from the value of the transferred property.
These rulings are the result of the two earlier Tax Court decisions of Lingo v. Commissioner,
23 T.C.M. (P-H) T 54,145 (1954), and Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), in which
gifts were made in inter vivos trusts and the trustees were obligated to make the gift tax payments.
The Tax Court held that the present value of the gifts could be reduced by the present worth of the
future tax payments, reasoning that the donor did not intend the amount of property necessary for
the gift tax liability to be a gift, and thus, it was not effective as property passing from the donor.
The net gift transfer is not used as a method of reducing gift tax liability. It does allow the
donor to shift his burden of taxation but does not reduce the ultimate amount of the gift tax. Gift
tax savings of the net gift vis-k-vis a conventional gift are illusory because the net gift is premised
on the assumption that the donor would have had to sell part of the contemplated gift property to
be able to pay the gift taxes on the smaller than originally planned conventional gift that would
follow the sale. So in either case the gift tax would be computed on a smaller gift.
The true benefit of the net gift is that the donor does not have to sell part of the property to
pay the gift taxes. This results in a reduction of the donor's capital gains tax burden. This avoid-
ance of recognition of capital gain is one reason the income tax consequences of the net gift have
long been disputed. Lingo, Harrison and Rev. Rul. 75-72 do not provide any direct answer to this
income tax issue because they do not address the question.
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While income is generally not recognized on the making of out-
right, unconditional gifts, the question has arisen whether a net gift
transfer alters this result.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held in Turner v. Commissioner4 that it does not. A later
Sixth Circuit decision, Johnson v. Commissioner,5 cast uncertainty on
the vitality of Turner by holding that a donor realized taxable gain in a
transfer slightly different in form from the Turner net gift.' Recently
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Hirst v. Commissioner,7 held that the net gift transfer of appreciated
real property to family members does not result in any taxable gain to
the donor.8
Taxpayer in Hirst9 owned an undivided one-half interest in three
tracts of highly appreciated, unimproved land.' 0 In an effort to relieve
herself of a heavy estate tax burden and out of a desire to benefit the
natural objects of her bounty, she decided to make a gift" of the tracts
3. The agreement to pay the gift taxes provides several bases on which to argue for income
taxation of the donor. As provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (1957), the gift could be character-
ized as part sale, part gift: a sale to the extent the gift tax exceeds the donor's adjusted basis in the
property; and a gift to the extent the value of the property is greater than the gift tax. Alterna-
tively, payment of the gift tax could confer benefits on the donor that fall within the broad defini-
tion of income found in I.R.C. § 61, especially income from discharge of indebtedness. The donee
is made primarily liable for payment of the gift taxes by agreement and thus the donor is dis-
charged from his former obligation to pay the taxes. The donor is also arguably "shedding" a
debt by having the donee in essence assume the tax encumbrance placed on the gift property by
the donor.
Despite these bases of recovery, it is easy to see why courts are hesitant even to think about
the income tax consequences of a net gift. First, they usually occur in a family context and the
donative intent of the donor is obvious (although the question of the extent of this intent is not
usually raised). Second, the economic benefits to the donor are not as apparent as cash in hand.
4. 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), a f'gper curiam 49 T.C. 356 (1968).
5. 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), af'g on other grounds 59 T.C. 791 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Duhl & Cohen, The Net Wt Technique: A Current Analysis of the Requirements
for Its Successful Use, 42 J. TAX. 158 (1975); Malstrom, A Shadow Over "Net Gifts," 64 ILL. B.J.
50 (1975); Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA.
L. REv. 935 (1976); Note, Bad Newsfor Net Givers: Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxa-
ble Income to Donor, 36 U. PiTT. L. REv. 517 (1974).
7. 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
8. Id at 428.
9. Taxpayer was an 81 year old widow whose married son, one of the donees, was her only
living child. Id at 434-35.
10. Id at 435. Taxpayer's adjusted basis and the appraised value of each tract was found to
be as follows:
Donor's Adjusted Basis Value
Tract 1 $4,654 $291,832.50
Tract 2 3,723 119,404.50
Tract 3 -0- 33,351.50
11. Id Taxpayer transferred her interest in one tract to her son and his wife outright, and her
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to her family. Realizing that she could not pay the resulting gift taxes
because of her lack of liquid assets,' 2 she had her son agree orally
before the transfers that he would pay all the assessable gift taxes on all
the transfers.' 3 A gift tax return that computed the taxes due by the net
gift method was filed, 4 and the son and his wife actually paid all the
gift taxes.' 5 The Commissioner asserted a deficiency in taxpayer's in-
come tax return, claiming she recognized taxable gain to the extent the
gift taxes paid exceeded her adjusted basis in the property.' 6 The Tax
Court found for the taxpayer.' 7 The court of appeals reversed this de-
cision, but on rehearing en banc, a majority of the court affirmed the
Tax Court decision.'" The majority reasoned that taxpayer intended
no sale and received no economic benefit or gain.' 9 Johnson was dis-
tinguished on its facts and the decision rested solely on the authority of
Turner, which the majority considered dispositive of the question.20 A
strong dissent argued that Turner was no longer good authority and
found that in substance taxpayer exchanged a portion of the gift prop-
erty for the amount of gift taxes paid.'
The authority primarily relied on by the Hirst court was Turner v.
Commissioner. The Turner donor made gifts of stock to three of her
interest in the other two tracts to two grandchildren outright and to her son as trustee for her third
minor grandchild.
12. Id At the time taxpayer decided to transfer her interests in the land, she owned the house
in which she lived, a one-half interest in a house being used as an office building, and had $25,000
on deposit in savings accounts. Id
13. Id That only two of the five donees agreed to and did pay all the gift taxes in question
was not addressed by the court.
14. Id For a discussion of the net gift computation, see note 2 supra.
15. 572 F.2d at 435. A total $85,469.55 in gift tax was paid of which $68,277.00 was federal
gift tax and $17,192.55 was state gift tax.
16. Id at 435-36. The Commissioner made the following calculations:
Total gift tax paid $85,469.55
Less adjusted basis of property 8,377.00
Realized gain 77,092.55
Recognized gain-50% (capital treatment) 38,546.28
17. 63 T.C. 307, 310 (1974), a.F'dper cur/am en banc, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
18. 572 F.2d at 428.
19. Id at 431.
20. Id at 428. Senior Circuit Judge Bryan's opinion dissenting from the decision of the
panel, later made part of the majority en banc opinion, was based in part on the inviolability of
the Tax Court's findings of fact and law. Id at 432-33. This Note does not address this issue. For
a discussion of this issue, see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1945);
Commissioner v. Scottish Am. Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1944); Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1943).
21. 572 F.2d at 437-39 (Winter and Butzner, JJ., dissenting).
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children outright and six gifts in trust22 for the benefit of her grandchil-
dren. Each transfer was conditioned on the recipient paying the gift
,tax. The gift taxes were paid by the individuals out of available cash
and sales of some of the stock, and by the trusts from sales of part of
the stock, loans, and small amounts of current trust income. The Com-
missioner alleged that the transfers were part sale, part gift.23 The Tax
Court rejected the part sale analysis24 and held that the transfers were
net gifts that produced no taxable gain for the donor.2" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affimed per curiam. 26
The Turner decision was questioned by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. Commissioner (the decision that the
22. The Turner, Johnson, and Hirst decisions are related to a line of cases dealing with gift
tax agreements in the context of gifts in trust. Realization of taxable income has generally been
found when trust income is used to pay gift taxes because the donor is considered to have retained
an income interest in the trust that is taxable to him under I.R.C. §§ 671, 677 (sections attributing
trust income to grantor as substantial owner of portion of trust).
In Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aj7'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 786 (1943), the decedent donor transferred stock in trust in return for the trustee's prom-
ise to pay him cash from the trust income, which the donor used to pay the gift taxes. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this was income reserved by the donor and
taxable to him as ordinary income. The Staley decision was relied on in a series of cases in which
trustees paid the gift tax out of the trust income. In Sheaffer's Estate v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99
(1961), af'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963), the trustee was given
discretion to use the trust income to pay the donor's gift tax liability. The gift tax was paid in part
from the current income of the trusts and in part from borrowed funds. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that income was reserved for the benefit of the donor and
was taxable to him under I.R.C. §§ 671, 677. In Commissioner v. Morgan's Estate, 37 T.C. 981
(1962), aft'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963), the trustees were given
discretion to sell trust corpus or borrow funds using the corpus as security to obtain funds to pay
the gift tax. The trustees used borrowed funds to pay the gift tax and then repaid the loans from
trust income in subsequent years. The Tax Court held that I.R.C. § 677 did not apply because the
gift taxes had been paid and the repayment of the loan did not confer any benefit on the donor. In
light of Morgan there was an entirely new proceeding in Sheaffer. The Tax Court in Estate of
Sheaffer, 35 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 66,126 (1966), held in line with Morgan that the repayment of a loan
out of trust income did not give rise to taxable income. The court also held, however, that the use
of current trust income to pay a later year's tax deficiency was taxable to the donor in accord with
the first Sheaffer decision.
23. At trial and again on appeal, the Commissioner conceded that the transfers in trust were
not sales. 410 F.2d at 753.
24. The Tax Court also rejected the part sale, part gift argument in Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C.
1242 (1972), in which the court held that because the donor had no further interest in the trust to
which the gift was made, and because the transfer was a net gift, not a part sale, which under
Turner was not an income producing transfer, the donor realized no taxable gain when the trustee
paid the gift taxes out of the proceeds of a loan secured by the trust. The Turner rationale was
relied on once again in Davis v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,318 (1971), aft'dper curlam,
469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the Tax Court held that the donor realized no taxable gain
when the trustee paid the gift taxes out of cash on hand from a prior year because the donor
retained no interest in the trust and because, as in Turner, the donor intended a net gift and not a
part sale. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam the Tax
Court's disposition of the part sale contention. 469 F.2d 694, 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968).
26. 410 F.2d at 753.
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Commissioner argued was controlling in Hirst). The donor in Johnson
made a gift in trust for his children of stock that was subject to a secur-
ity interest under a loan agreement entered into by the donor immedi-
ately before making the gift. Under this prior arrangement, the lending
bank received a thirty day note on which the donor had "no personal
liability." The trustees of the trust to which Johnson transferred the
stock, the donor's wife and the bank, replaced the donor's note with
their own secured by the trust corpus. The donor used most of the loan
proceeds to pay the gift tax. The Tax Court held the transfer to be a
part sale resulting in taxable gain to the donor, distinguishing Turner
on the ground that the Johnson gift was not conditioned on payment of
the gift taxes by the trustees.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court
result but rejected its reasoning, relying instead on three different bases
for finding against the taxpayer. The first basis for the Johnson holding
was that the gift of $150,000 worth of stock was an exchange for
$200,000 in cash, which was income regardless of how the donor used
the money. The second was that the donee, by paying the gift taxes,
discharged the donor's legal obligation, resulting in the donor's con-
structive receipt of income under the doctrine of Old Colony Trust v.
Commissioner.28 In that case, payment of income taxes by an employer
in consideration for services rendered by an employee was held by the
United States Supreme Court to be taxable income to the employee.
The third basis, and the one most heavily relied on by the court, was
the finding that the donor "shed" his debt to the trust and realized in-
come in that amount, based on the court's extension of the rule in
Crane v. Commissioner.29 In that case the amount of a mortgage on the
seller's house for which neither the seller nor buyer had any primary
personal liability was held by the United States Supreme Court to be
part of the seller's amount realized on sale of the house.
The court was clearly correct in finding that Turner and Hirst were
27. 59 T.C. 791, 812-13 (1973). The Tax Court distinguished Turner further by finding no
reservation of an interest in the trust, and on the ground that the loans were not the same thing as
a donor's gift tax liability. Id
28. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
29. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The court in Johnson extended the narrow Crane holding that "shed-
ding" encumbrances constitutes an element of gain in sales of real property, to apply to the situa-
tion in which encumbered property is the subject of a gift, the amount of the encumbrance there
being treated as a part sale. 495 F.2d at 1083-84. This reasoning may extend to net gift situations
in which the gift property is "encumbered" by the obligation to pay the gift taxes, which is as-
sumed by the donee by pregift agreement. The scope of application of this "shedding of liability"
principle is still very much in debate. See Note, Income Tax Consequences ofEncumbered Gifts:
Thedvent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 935 (1976).
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factually almost indistinguishable" and that each involved proper use
of the net gift form of transfer.3 1 The court was also correct in finding
that Turner was not overruled by Johnson, but only limited to its
facts.32 But the reasoning of the Hirst court is weak in several respects
due to the acceptance of Turner as valid precedent and to the refusal to
consider the arguments raised in Johnson as they apply to a net gift
form of transfer.
First, in accord with Turner,33 the court found that the donor only
intended to make a net gift and not a part sale, part gift, as contended
by the Commissioner. The gift tax label for the transaction does not,
however, automatically determine its income tax consequences.34 The
donor's intent pertaining to all portions of the transfer must be ana-
lyzed to see if this type of gift transfer creates any basis for finding
taxable income. 'he donative intent behind a net gift differs from that
accompanying an unconditional gift. In the former case the donor's
donative intent is limited to the net portion of the gift, while in the
latter the donative intent goes to the whole gift property. It is not
clear what the donor's intent is with respect to the part of the property
that is allocated to the gift tax. Restructuring the transfer, it is arguable
that this portion of the gift property remained with the donor who then
exchanged it with the donee for the donee's payment of the gift taxes.
The Hirst court did not examine the possibility that there was such an
exchange.36
Second, the court rejected the argument that the donee's payment
of the gift taxes was a discharge of the donor's legal obligation resulting
in income to the donor.37 This argument was raised in Johnson38 but
not in Turner.39 The court found the discharge of obligations rule to be
30. 572 F.2d at 428, 433.
31. The correctness of the court's finding is supported by Rev. Rul. 75-72, discussed in note 2
supra, which limits the use of this device to cases in which the donee's agreement to pay the gift
taxes is a condition of the gift transfer.
32. 495 F.2d at 1086.
33. The Turner court affirmed the Tax Court in rejecting only the part sale, part gift argu-
ment. 49 T.C. 356, 362-64 (1968).
34. See note 2 supra.
35. See id
36. The Tax Court in Hirst recognized the possibility that there had been an exchange. 63
T.C. 307, 315 (1974).
37. For a discussion of the discharge of obligations doctrine, see note 3 and text accompany-
ing note 28 supra. See also Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
38. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
39. 410 F.2d at 753. The Tax Court in Hirst conceded that the reasoning used in Johnson
was a more "realistic" view of the net gift, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974), but nevertheless abided by
Turner, as did the court of appeals.
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a flexible one that depends on the relations of the parties and the exist-
ence of other obligations.' The court implied in a hypothetical that
the son's payment of the gift tax was a "gift back" to his mother result-
ing in no taxable income to her.4 The facts do not support this gift
back theory however. The donee was obligated by a promise to the
donor to pay the gift taxes for the donor's benefit in order to receive the
gift of property. Also, the donee paid no gift tax on his payment of the
gift taxes. In essence, the transfer was a payment to the donor in return
for the gift, which was then used to satisfy the gift taxes.42
Third, the court stated that the substance of the net gift transaction
rather than its form should control the donor's tax liability,43 but relied
nevertheless on the net giftform of the transfer to reach its result.44 In
substance, the donor in Hirst was attempting to arrange for payment of
the gift taxes without incurring any taxable gain in the process. This
goal was carried out in Turner and Hirst by use of the net gift transfer.
This same goal was attempted in Johnson by a transfer in which the net
gift device was not used, but in that case the donor had to pay income
tax as a cost of achieving this goal. It is difficult to reconcile these op-
posing tax results given the common underlying substance of the trans-
actions. Had taxpayer in Hirst, as in Johnson, taken out a loan using
the gift property as security before the transfer, used the proceeds to
pay the gift taxes, and then transferred the encumbered property, she
would have realized taxable income. Had she sold a capital asset
before the transfer to raise cash to pay the gift taxes she would have
realized taxable gain. Had she retained a portion of the capital asset
transferred equal in value to the amount of gift taxes due and ex-
changed this with the donee for the payment of the gift taxes, she
would have realized taxable gain from the exchange. But because she
used a net gift form of transfer she could make the same gift and get the
taxes paid at no additional tax cost, even though she thereby seemed to
40. 572 F.2d at 431.
41. Id
42. Cf Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) (taxpayer realized income when, pursuant to
contract, a trust discharged his debt).
43. 572 F.2d at 430; see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
44. In form, Hirst received no cash in hand from the transfer nor did she make a sale of her
property in the ordinary sense of the term. But in substance she did not need to receive cash in
hand to realize economic benefit from the transfer. For a discussion of the capital gains tax sav-
ings available with use of the net gift, see note 2 supra. Also, in substance she did not need
technically to make a sale in order to realize income from the transfer. See Helvering v. Bruun,
309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
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enjoy economic gain. It appears that the court in Hirst did not ade-
quately analyze the substance of the net gift and compare it with that of
other forms of transfer before deciding on its income tax consequences.
In this respect, the court let the form of the transfer control its result.
In Hirst, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has given
renewed approval to the use of the net gift transfer as a tax saving de-
vice and has reduced the uncertainty surrounding its use after the
Johnson decision. Donors lacking cash can still use this gift technique
and benefit additionally from the capital gains tax savings that arise
from using it. The donee will still only have to pay gift tax on the net
gift, not the full value of the property transferred. Courts will continue
to have to base their tax results on factual distinctions concerning the
form of the transfer. Congress ultimately may have to step in and more
clearly provide for taxation of the donor in these situations or provide
for nonrecognition of gain if policy should so suggest. Until then, how-
ever, courts should consider applying existing doctrines such as Old
Colony Trust and Crane to achieve more consistent income tax results.
The issue in Hirst is a close one that has given a great deal of
conceptual trouble to the courts. Unfortunately, the Hirst court de-
cided to adhere to the factually similar Turner decision, without ade-
quately dealing with the critical analysis made of that case in Johnson.
Thus, the court did not fully consider the conditional nature of the gift,
the limits to the donative intent, the exchange element of part of the
transfer,. the presence of economic gain, and the applicability of non-
sale bases for finding taxable income such as the Old Colony Trust and
Crane doctrines. A closer examination of these factors should produce
a different net gift income tax result than the one reached in Hirst. But
until Congress acts or the United States Supreme Court decides to re-
solve the inconsistencies between Johnson on the one hand, and Turner
and Hirst on the other, the net gift device will continue to have vitality
and tax planning utility in the Fourth Circuit.
WILLIAM L. BROWN
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Tort Law-The Continuing Threat to Privacy by Consumer
Reporting Agencies
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc. I presented the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit with a request to utilize common law tort
principles to provide meaningful protection against encroachments on
individual privacy by consumer reporting firms.' These firms collect
and retain personal information for subsequent dissemination in con-
sumer and investigative consumer reports,3 thereby creating serious
threats to individual privacy. Presently, individuals have virtually no
remedy for invasions of privacy by consumer reporting firms;4 the ac-
tivities of these firms do not fit comfortably within the recognized
classes of the privacy tort, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act makes
insufficient provision for the protection of individual privacy.5 Unfor-
tunately, the court of appeals failed to take the opportunity presented
in Tureen to provide a remedy against abusive reporting practices.
1. 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978).
2. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 168la(f) (1976), provides:
The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, for monetary fees,
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information
on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties ....
3. The Fair Credit Reporting Act defines "consumer report" as "any written, oral or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal charac-
teristics, or mode of living" that is to be used as a factor in determining the consumer's eligibility
for credit, insurance, employment or other purposes authorized by the Act. Id. § 1681a(d).
An investigative consumer report is "a consumer report or portion thereof in which informa-
tion on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is
obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer re-
ported on or with others with whom he is acquainted." 1d. § 1681a(e).
Consumer reports are often distinguished from investigative consumer reports; the former are
typically used by small credit bureaus that furnish information on the credit worthiness of individ-
uals to credit-grantors, while the latter are typically used by investigatory agencies (such as
Equifax) that furnish comprehensive dossiers on the personal lives of individuals for insurance
companies, prospective employers, prospective landlords and the like. Because of the breadth of
personal information included in investigative reports, these reports are more likely than con-
sumer reports to intrude upon individual privacy. Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN.
L. REv. 819, 819-21 (1972).
4. See generally Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy Quest For a Remedy, 57
GEo. L.J. 509 (1969).
5. The Fair Credit Reporting Act was designed to ensure that consumer reporting agencies
operate on the basis of fairness, impartiality and respect for the consumer's right of privacy. 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(4) (1976). The Act restricts access to reports to prospective creditors, insurers,
employers and others with a legitimate business need. Id. § 168 lb(3). Consumers must ordinarily
be notified when an investigative report is requested. Id. § 1681d(a). Reporting agencies must
disclose the contents of their file on an individual upon the individual's request, id. § 168 lg, and
certain obsolete material may not be released except in connection with certain high value transac-
tions, id. § 168 Ic. The Act, however, makes reporting agencies liable only for wilful or negligent
INVSION OF PRIVA CY
The Tureen problem began when Equifax6 submitted an investiga-
tive report to All-American Insurance Company7 containing irrelevant8
and allegedly false information9 pertaining to plaintiff's past applica-
tions for life and health insurance. Plaintiff brought an invasion of pri-
vacy action against Equifax in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri. The action, framed simply as an invasion
of privacy,° was based on the inclusion of the irrelevant insurance un-
derwriting history in Equifax's report. Without elaborating on
plaintiff's conclusory allegation of an invasion of privacy, the District
Court instructed the jury that in order to find an invasion of plaintiff's
privacy, they must find that the underwriting history was irrelevant and
that the inclusion of this information on the health report would be
failure to comply with the Act, id. §§ 168 In, 1681o, and forbids an action for defamation, invasion
of privacy or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against the agency, any user
of the information, or any person who furnishes information to the agency, unless false informa-
tion was furnished with malice or wilful intent to injure the consumer, id. § 1681h(e).
Despite rights conferred upon individuals by -the Act, there is strong evidence that abusive
practices by reporting finns, such as failure to verify adverse information, application of pressure
on investigators to produce an unrealistic number of daily reports and quotas of adverse informa-
tion, continue. Comment, Commercial Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24
AM. U.L. REV. 421,426-38 (1975); Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer
Reports: Little Brother is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 776-82 (1975). See
generally Note, Fair Credit Reorting Act: The Casefor Revision, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 409 (1977).
6. Equifax, formerly known as Retail Credit Company, is the largest individual consumer
investigative firm in the country and has been the subject of governmental investigations on inva-
sions of privacy. See Comment, supra note 5, at 421-26; Note, Constitutional Right ofPrivacy and
Investigative Consumer Reports; Little Brother Is Watching You, supra note 5, at 774 n.4.
7. 571 F.2d at 412-14. Plaintiff maintained a health insurance policy with All-American.
After suffering two heart attacks, he filed a disability claim for benefits pursuant to this policy.
All-American hired Equifax to determine if plaintiff actually was disabled. Id. at 412-13.
8. The irrelevance of information on plaintiffs past applications for life and health insur-
ance included in the investigative report "is acknowledged in the report, where, after three insur-
ance carriers are listed it is stated that '[w]e are not quoting the remainder of the 23 insurance
companies due to their age."' Id. at 422 n.12 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
9. Plaintiff originally brought this action as two claims, one alleging invasion of privacy,
and the other alleging that the report's statements concerning plaintiffs past insurance history
were libelous. Because the statute of limitations on the libel claim had run, that claim was dis-
missed, and the case proceeded to trial solely on the issue of invasion of privacy. Id. at 413-14.
10. Plaintiffsimply alleged that his privacy had been invaded; he did not classify the invasion
according to one of the four torts recognized by Prosser as comprised in the general name "inva-
sion of privacy." See note 34 infra.
11. Mr. Tureen objected to the following portion of the report:
FILE DIGEST: A thorough check of our files reveals no previous claim history on Ber-
nard H. Tureen. The last underwriting report was a special life report done on 6-13-68.
This report was for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co .... Amount applied for
was $100,000 and at the time he was carrying $4,000,000. Beneficiary was the American
Duplex Corp. of which he was President. Insurance history indicates we had reported on
23 occasions to various account numbers for life insurance going back to 1949. Total
amount applied for for [sic] life was in excess of $10,000,000. ...
571 F.2d at 413.
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offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities."2 A jury verdict for
plaintiff was reversed by the court of appeals.1 3  The court recast
plaintiff's general invasion of privacy action as one for the specific torts
of intrusion and public disclosure of private facts, 4 and found the req-
uisite elements of each tort lacking.
Intrusion and public disclosure of private facts are discrete torts.
The tort of intrusion is composed of two elements: (1) intentional in-
trusion, physical or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or of his private affairs or concerns, and (2) the intrusion must be high-
ly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.1 5 Actionable intru-
sions have been based on nonphysical invasions such as wiretapping,1 6
peering through windows, 17 persistent phone calls,18 and unauthorized
prying into bank accounts.19
The tort of public disclosure of private facts consists of publicizing
matters concerning an individual's private life when the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person
and is not a matter of legitimate public concern.20 No precise defini-
tion of publicity has been formulated, yet the parameters of the term
are well established. It is clear that publication in any newspaper 2 or
magazine, 2 or by radio23 or television broadcast,24 meets the require-
ment of publicity, while publication in the sense of a communication to
another person sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement in defa-
mation actions does not.25 Confusion exists about what constitutes
12. Id. at 414.
13. The court of appeals held that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for
directed verdict at the close of the evidence. Id.
14. Id. at 415.
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 808 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
16. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
17. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
18. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
19. Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (decided on constitutional ground of
protection against unreasonable search as well as invasion of privacy); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq.
386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 809-12. Prosser's definition has been accepted in case law.
See, e.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69,78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976).
21. Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
22. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
23. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
24. Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div.-Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App.
1971).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment a at 384 (1977).
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publicity in the range between media publication and ordinary conver-
sation largely because this question is seldom faced by courts; most
public disclosure cases are based on media publication and turn on
whether the matter involved is of legitimate public concern.
In assessing plaintiffs claim as one of intrusion, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit found two possible bases for an actionable
intrusion: (1) the utilization of objectionable snooping techniques by
Equifax and (2) the mere collection and retention by Equifax of plain-
tiff's underwriting history.26 Because the information disclosed to All-
American was already in Equifax's files, and therefore no snooping was
necessary to obtain the information, the first hypothetical basis posed
by the court was summarily rejected. The court also rejected the sec-
ond proposed basis of intrusion. After a brief discussion of the role of
consumer reports in modern society, the court held that because there
may be a legitimate purpose for the collection of an individual's past
insurance history in some circumstances, the collection of plaintiffs
past insurance history alone was not an intrusion.'
Public disclosure of private facts as a basis of recovery by plaintiff
was likewise rejected by the Tureen court. The court's analysis of this
tort focused on the requirement that there be a "public" disclosure; the
court ultimately concluded that the submission of plaintiff's investiga-
tive report to All-American was not a public disclosure and, therefore,
not an invasion of privacy.2" In its analysis of the publicity require-
ment the court was handicapped by the lack of authority, both in Mis-
souri and other jurisdictions, on the issue of the extent of publicity
required to consititute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. The
court relied heavily on Peacock v. Retail Credit Co.,29 the only case to
address squarely the issue whether submission of credit and investiga-
tive reports'by consumer reporting firms to its clients constitutes a
"public" disclosure of facts. The Peacock court held that the "mere
submission of a confidential credit report, even when it contains false
and libelous information, by a credit information company to its cus-
tomers, is not a 'public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.' "3o
Adhering to this precedent, the Tureen court held that the submission
26. 571 F.2d at 415-16.
27. Id. at 416-17.
28. Id. at 419.
29. 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aft'd, 429 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
938 (1971).
30. Id. at 423.
19791
NORTH CAROLINA L.AWREVIEW [Vol. 57
of plaintiff's investigative report to All-American was not a public
disclosure.
The Tureen court's analysis of the torts of intrusion and publica-
tion of private facts is in accord with the modem trend of classifying
invasion of privacy actions in terms of Prosser's four categories of the
tort.3t While disagreement continues about the exact nature of the
right of privacy and the interests it protects, 32 courts have increasingly
adopted33 Prosser's view that the right of privacy spawned a family of
four distinct torts that have little in common except the general name
"invasion of privacy."'34 Courts have foregone any attempt at a com-
prehensive definition of the right of privacy, preferring instead to pi-
geonhole invasion of privacy actions into one of Prosser's categories.
Strict application of these categories has rigidified the right of privacy,
rendering it incapable of accommodating new fact situations. This de-
velopment is contrary to the common law35 origins of the right; initially
31. Prosser classifies invasion of privacy actions into four categories: (1) appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's personal advantage or benefit; (2) intrusion upon
the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (3) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff, and (4) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 802-14. This classification was adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E, at 376-400 (1977).
32. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others."); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (right of privacy based on "inviolate personality"); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960) (privacy not a right in itself but sum of particular interests in mental tranquility,
reputation, and one's own identity protected by this right); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity:AnAnswer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964) (right of privacy based
on human dignity). See generally Gerety, Redfning Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233
(1977); Thomson, The Right To Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496, 499-504 (1966).
34. "The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of
the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common . . . ." Prosser, supra note 32, at 389.
Taking them in order-intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation--the first
and second require the invasion of something secret, secluded or private pertaining to
the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second and third depend upon publicity,
while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although it usually involves it. The third
requires falsity or fiction; the other three do not. The fourth involves a use for the de-
fendant's advantage, which is not true of the rest.
Id. at 407.
35. A common law right of privacy was first recognized by a court of last resort in Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The right of privacy is now acknowl-
edged in either the common law or the statutes of virtually every jurisdiction. W. PROSSER, supra
note 15, at 804; e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 839
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-402 to -405 (1978); VA. CODE § 2.1-378 (1978).
The common law right of privacy recognized in state tort law is not to be equated with emerg-
ing constitutional rights of privacy. Although there is no specific mention of a right of privacy in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965),
recognized the existence of various "zones of privacy" emanating from specific guarantees found
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characterized in amorphous terms such as a "right to be let alone"36 or
a right "'to determine one's mode of life, whether it shall be a life of
publicity or of privacy,' "37 the early right of privacy provided the indi-
vidual a broad, flexible basis of protection.38
Tureen exemplifies the inflexible approach to the privacy tort
adopted by courts, and the resultant failure39 of the right of privacy to
provide meaningful protection in the modem world of extensive data
collection and dissemination."n The Tureen court narrowly construed
the torts of intrusion and public disclosure to deny a remedy for abu-
sive consumer reporting practices.4" The court could instead have
adopted several theories urged upon it that would have expanded the
existing conceptual framework of the torts of intrusion and public dis-
closure to accommodate the Tureen facts without doing violence to the
recognized elements of these torts. 42
in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court subsequently held that a constitutional right of privacy
is implicit in the "Fourteenth Amendement's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action" or "in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people." Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Courts have narrowly construed this right, holding thus far that the
constitutional right of privacy protects only the most intimate phases of personal life, such as an
individual's marital, familial, and sexual activities, from state interference. McNally v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-77 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Industrial Founda-
tion of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 678-81 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 931 (1977); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969). For a discussion of the relationship between the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy and a constitutional right of privacy, see Note, Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion
of Privacy. The Development of the Remedy in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770, 299 S.W. 967, 969-70 (1927); Barber v.
Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1205, 159 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1942).
37. See, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 38, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956) (quoting
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 190, 50 S.E. 68, 68 (1905)).
38. Early cases, invoking the common law's capacity for growth and expansion and its adapt-
ability to the needs and requirements of changing conditions, recognized violations of a right of
privacy in varying fact situations. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga.
App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936) (impersonation of plaintiff by defendant's agent for purpose of
procuring confidential information an invasion of plaintiffs privacy); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky.
765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (conspicuous sign in store window advertising plaintiffs debt an invasion
of plaintiffs privacy); Heinish v. Meir & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (telegram
sent to governor bearing plaintiff's unauthorized signature an invasion of plaintiff's right to pri-
vacy); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (search of plaintiff by store manager an
invasion of plaintiff's privacy).
39. See Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1974); Peacock v. Retail
Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aft'd, 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 938 (1971). See generally Note, supra note 4.
40. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND
DoSSIERS (1971); A. WESTIN, supra note 32.
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 571 F.2d at 416-17. The court's conclusion that the collection of past insurance informa-
tion pertinent to the legitimate business needs of a reporting agency's customers is sound; this
activity is not offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities, and is an indispensable accoutrement
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Specifically, the accepted definition of intrusion is broad enough to
encompass the collection by consumer reporting firms of private infor-
mation unrelated to any conceivable business need, and the distribu-
tion of private information that is relevant to some business need
served by consumer reports but is not relevant to any legitimate busi-
ness need served by the particular report.43 The collection and distri-
bution of private information by consumer reporting firms is arguably
a nonphysical intrusion upon the individual's private affairs or con-
cerns, not unlike prying into an individual's bank account. Unautho-
rized prying into bank accounts has been held to be an actionable
intrusion;44 it is no great conceptual leap to find that the gathering of
personal information unrelated to any business need served by con-
sumer reports is a form of prying into one's private concerns and,
hence, an intrusion. This argument can be expanded to include the
dissemination of information that is relevant to some business need but
is not relevant for the purposes of the particular report. By including
such irrelevant information in its report, the firm is in effect forcing its
customer to pry into the individual's private affairs. The result in both
circumstances is the same: strictly private information has become
known to persons having no right to this information.
The Tureen court did not consider either facet of this intrusion
of modem life. Although this conclusion is sound, the court's reasoning in support is faulty: the
court confused the elements of intrusion with those of publication of private facts. The court
seemingly conceded that the collection and retention of personal data such as underwriting history
constitutes an actionable intrusion because it attempted to justify the intrusion on the basis of
overriding public interest. A legitimate public interest in publicized information is a defense to a
publication of private facts complaint, but it is not a defense to an intrusion action.
Both Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), and Langworthy v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963), which the Tureen court cited in support of ith conclu-
sion, involved newspaper publication of facts about plaintiffs. Neither case suggested that an
otherwise actionable intrusion may be justified by an overriding public interest in the intrusion.
Discussion of public interest as a defense to an invasion of privacy action focused on harmonizing
the right of privacy with unabridged freedom of the press and application of the principle that the
press may report matters of public interest with impunity. 348 Mo. at 206, 159 S.W.2d at 295; 368
S.W.2d at 389-90.
43. The American Law Institute explained the scope of the tort of intrusion in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has se-
cluded himself .... It may also be by use of the defendant's senses, with or without
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, as by looking into
his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone lines. It may be by some
other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his
private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank
account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his per-
sonal documents.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, Comment b at 378-79 (1977).
44. See cases cited note 19 supra.
INVASION OF PRIVA4CY
argument, even though a similar argument was raised and rejected in
Peacock. The Peacock court rejected the argument on the ground that
Georgia law recognized only physical intrusions analogous to tres-
pass. 45 Missouri law, the controlling law in Tureen, imposes no similar
restrictions on intrusion actions; 46 thus, the court did not have the bar-
rier to adopting this interpretation faced by the Peacock court.
The Tureen court's analysis of public disclosure was as routine as
its intrusion analysis. Lack of authority on the question of what consti-
tutes publicity forced undeserved reliance on Peacock. The Peacock
court drew on a hodgepodge of Georgia case law to reach its conclu-
sion,4 7 apparently operating on the premise that what is not expressly
included in the concept of publicity by prior case law is excluded. Af-
ter cursory examination of a wide variety of invasion of privacy ac-
tions, the court declared that none of the cases examined supported the
theory that disclosure of private information in credit reports is a "pub-
lic" disclosure. While it is certainly true that none of the cases cited in
Peacock lends particular support to the theory that such a disclosure is
a "public" disclosure, neither do they lend strong support to the theory
that it is not. None of the cited cases dealt specifically with an analysis
of the publicity requirement; in fact, the requirement was not even al-
luded to in a few of these cases.48 Furthermore, because the cited cases
are old, they are not framed in terms of Prosser's categories. Conse-
quently, it is probably inappropriate to apply unqualifiedly the general
statements on invasion of privacy in these cases to the distinct branches
of the tort recognized today.
Of the cases cited in Peacock, Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v.
45. 302 F. Supp. at 422.
46. Jurisdiction in Tureen was based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976). Missouri substantive law therefore was controlling. 571 F.2d at 417, 421.
47. Two of the five cases relied upon by the court in Peacock, Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga.
161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956), and Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930),
focused on the question of what is a matter of legitimate public concern. The other three, Gould-
man-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957), Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga.
App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959), and Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57
S.E.2d 225 (1950), involved debtor-creditor situations and application of the principle that a credi-
tor may take reasonable steps to collect outstanding debts without invading the debtor's privacy.
48. Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956), and Bazemore v. Savannah
Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930), involved newspaper publication of photographs and
subsequent resale of the published photographs by the newspaper. The courts explored the scope
of the legitimate public concern element and, peripherally, the question of survival of privacy
actions. Neither case reached the question of publicity, presumably because the publicity require-
ment was obviously satisfied.
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Zerbst49 offers the best support for the Peacock holding, and this sup-
port is at best ambiguous. The question before the court in Gouldman
was whether a letter written by a creditor to an employer notifying the
employer of his employee's indebtedness to the creditor and seeking the
employer's aid in collecting the debt constituted a violation of the em-
ployee's right of privacy. The court held that this was not an invasion
of the employee's privacy, stating that "in giving this information to an
employer, it [the creditor] was not giving to the general public informa-
tion concerning a private matter in which it had, or could have, no
legitimate interest," since an employer has a "natural and proper inter-
est in the debts of his employees." 50 It stretches credibility to infer that
the court intended a meaningful exposition of the term "publicity" by
this oblique reference to the general public. Any analogy drawn be-
tween a creditor and a consumer reporting firm would be inappropri-
ate. The case belongs in a class of debtor-creditor cases5' that
recognizes that creditors can take reasonable steps to collect debts with-
out interfering with the debtor's right of privacy;5" it did not deal with
the specific torts of public disclosure and intrusion as they are recog-
nized today.
Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., also cited in Peacock,
offered no support for the Peacock holding. The issue of publicity was
never reached in Davis, and there are even implications that disclosure
to one or a few individuals may satisfy the publicity requirement.
Plaintiff in Davis brought an action for libel and for invasion of pri-
vacy, both of which were based on publication by telegram of plaintiff's
debt to General Finance and Thrift Corporation.54 The telegram in
question was sent by defendant to plaintiff notifying him of his unpaid
debt; only Western Union employees who handled the message in the
course of its transmission could have seen the message. The Davis
court raised no objections to the invasion of privacy claim based on
"publication by telegram"; instead, the court dismissed the claim on the
basis that the telegram was not a flagrant breach of decency and propri-
ety55 and therefore was inoffensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
49. 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
50. Id. at 683-84, 100 S.E.2d at 883.
51. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 154, 158 (1970).
52. Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga. App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959), reiterated the principle estab-
lished in Gouldman without further clarification. The fact situation in Haggard is practically
identical to that of Gouldman, and the court simply borrowed the Gouldman holding.
53. 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
54. Id. at 708, 57 $.E.2d at 226.
55. Id. at 710-11, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
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Tureen perpetuated this superficial treatment of authority in its ex-
amination of Missouri case law.56 Biederman's of Springfeld, Inc. v.
Wright,57 cited as support for the proposition that public means "af-
fecting the community at large, '58 is actually authority for a more cir-
cumscribed definition of publicity. The court in Biederman's quoted
Prosser's expansive definition of publicity,59 but the facts of the case
indicate that such a broad definition of publicity could not have been
operative in the court's decision. The invasion of privacy claim in Bied-
erman's was based on the conduct of defendant store's collection agent.
The agent followed plaintiff around the cafe in which she worked on
three separate occasions, loudly declaring that plaintiff and her hus-
band were "deadbeats" and refused to pay their bills.60 The court
found that the agent's oral publication of plaintiffs debt in the cafe
satisfied any "reasonable requirement" of publicity. 61
The Tureen fact situation could easily have been brought within
the public disclosure of facts tort had the court not placed so much
weight on the actual number of persons apprised of particular facts.
The tort does not require that a communication actually reach a large
number of people, it merely requires that it have that potential.62 The
likelihood of widespread dissemination can be inferred from the me-
dium employed. A consumer reporting firm provides a means of dis-
seminating information as do newspapers, magazines, and public
records. Judge Hleaney, in his dissenting opinion, argued persuasively
that the medium of the consumer reporting firm provides a sufficient
likelihood of widespread dissemination to satisfy the publicity require-
ment of the public disclosure tort.63 Considering the practices of the
56. Two cases cited by the court, Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911),
and Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), involved publication in a newspa-
per and magazine respectively, thus obviating the need for analysis of the publicity requirement.
57. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
58. 571 F.2d at 419.
59. 322 S.W.2d at 398. Prosser defined publicity as "communication to the public in general
or to a large number of persons, as distinguished from one individual or a few." PROSSER ON
TORTS § 97, at 641 (2d ed. 1955). The present Restatement definition of publicity is a refinement
of Prosser's definition. "Publicity. . .means that the matter is made public, by communicating it
to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
certain to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Com-
ment a at 384 (1977).
60. 322 S.W.2d at 893-95.
61. Id. at 898.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Comment a at 384 (1977) (tort of public
disclosure requires "a communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public") (emphasis
added); Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-84
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
63. 571 F.2d at 420 (dissenting opinion).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
consumer reporting industry,' this is a much more realistic view than
that of the majority. Disclosure of private information in credit reports
does not end with its disclosure to one customer; information gathered
on individuals is retained in the files of the reporting office for use in
later reports made to any number of customers. While reporting firms
are prohibited by law from giving credit reports to those who do not
have a "legitimate" interest in them,65 this restriction is difficult to
enforce because of the vaguness of the term "legitimate business
purpose.
'66
In reaching its conservative result, the Tureen court may simply
have been following the directive to federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction to apply rather than expand state tort law. Nevertheless,
the Tureen court had the conceptual framework at its disposal to ex-
pand the torts of intrusion and public disclosure of private facts to in-
clude the collection and dissemination of private information by
consumer reporting firms, but refused to adopt the proferred interpreta-
tions. This unfortunate refusal denies individuals a much needed rem-
edy against abusive practices of the consumer reporting industry and
presents additional precedent for the narrow interpretation of publicity
adopted in Peacock. State courts faced with a fact situation similar to
the one presented in Tureen should consider Tureen in its proper juris-
dictional posture and not feel constrained by it from expanding state
tort law to provide a remedy.'
SABRA J. FAIRES
64. Credit and investigative reports are used extensively by creditors, insurance companies,
landlords, employers and numerous departments of the federal government such as the Justice
Department, the Civil Service Commission, and the Veterans Administration. Note, Constitu-
tional Right of Privacy and Inpestigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, supra
note 5, at 811-12.
65. The Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits furnishing a consumer report except with the
consumer's permission or for specified legitimate purposes. The legitimate purposes enumerated
in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3) (1976) are credit transactions, employment purposes, insurance underwrit-
ing, and the granting of government licenses or benefits. Section 168lb(3)(E), however, contains a
catch-all for all purposes not specifically listed; it authorizes consumer reporting firms to give
reports to anyone who "has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a
business transaction involving the consumer." Id. § 1681b(3)(E).
66. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcommr on Consumer Credit
o/Senate Comm on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 687 (1973) (state-
ment of Albert Foer).
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